Ivan Stepanovich Konev

The Early Years

Ivan Konev was born on the 28th of December 1897 in the village of Lodeino in the Nikolsk Province of northern Dvina. His mother died in childbirth and his grew up with his father, leaving school early to work in a timber mill. In April 1916 he was recruited into the Army and following a short training course emerged as a junior NCO. He was initially posted to an Artillery Division and served for one year in the Tsarist Army. After the October Revolution he returned home to his village and following an interest in politics he was made Military Commissar of the Nikolsk District.
During the Civil War he served on the eastern front, first as a commissar of an armored train and then as the commissar of the 17th Maritime Corps. Following the end of the Civil War he remained in the Army. In 1924 he became commissar and chief of the political section of the 17th Rifle Division in the Moscow Military District. In 1925 he attended a training course at the Frunze Military Academy and following his graduation he was first appointed as a Regimental commander and then in 1932, as commander of the 17th Rifle Division. While in this position, his Corps commander wrote of him, 'He is a commander who takes the full weight of his post on himself and always leads by example. He has overcome his initial shortcomings and he corresponds to what a good Divisional commander should be'. Despite this favorable description, a later report stated he could also be irritable and hot-tempered and often unrestrained towards his seniors. He often over reacted to criticism and found it difficult to get on with his Regimental commanders.
In 1932, Konev returned to the Frunze Academy for a further two years. In 1937 he was posted to Mongolia as commander of the 57th Corps and also acted as an advisor to the Mongolian Army. He did not however, take part in the Khalkin Gol operation against the Japanese. From 1938 to 1941 he served as commander of the 2nd Separate Red Banner Army in the Far Eastern, Transbaikal and then Northern Caucasus Military Districts.

The Early War Years

In May 1941 he was ordered to take command of the 19th Army and move it to Cherkassy in the Ukraine. The Army was then ordered to move onto the Moscow axis at Vitebsk. The deployment was carried out hastily and was made more difficult by constant German air attack. Despite the initial chaos, the 19th Army managed to temporarily hold Vitebsk, but was then forced to retreat towards Smolensk. The Army also managed to successfully carry out a limited counter attack ? against the German 9th Army in August. In September Konev was appointed commander of the Western Front with the responsibility for defending the approaches to Moscow. Responsibility for the disastrous defeat at Vyazma, with five entire Armies becoming encircled, lay with Konev. Stalin decided to remove Konev from his post and put him on trial by military tribunal with the threat of execution, however the strenuous protestations of the new Front commander, General Zhukov, saved Konev. He was demoted to serve as Zhukov's deputy commander and was sent to command the right flank of the Front at Kalinin. He took over this position in October, and despite being unable to hold the city, he managed to prevent further German progress, despite fierce fighting until December.
On December the 16th, as part of the General Russian winter counter offensive, Konev's forces recaptured the city of Kalinin. For his efforts during this operation, Konev was awarded the Order of Kutuzov. In August 1942, Konev regained control of the Western Front. Then in March 1943, he took control of first the Northwestern Front and then in June the Steppe Front. During the battle of Kursk, the Steppe Front was part of the Russian strategic reserve on the southern wing and elements of his Front were used to prevent penetration by German forces into the Russian defense lines. At the beginning of August, the Steppe Front went over to the offensive and advanced along the Belgorod-Kharkov axis, recapturing Kharkov on the 5th.

The Road to Berlin

In January 1944, the Steppe Front, now renamed the 1st Ukrainian Front, took part in the Korsun operation. During the operation ten German Divisions were encircled and heavily mauled in the Korsun pocket. The eventual breakout attempt saw the remaining force suffer appalling losses. Afterwards Konev commented on the scene, 'I had never seen, and never again saw, such a vast number of corpses in such a small area. Despite my orders for the capture of the group, the hopeless German attempt to break out, meant we had to meet force with force'. For his efforts during this operation, Konev was made a Marshal of the Soviet Union. However, his conduct during the operation had soured his relations with other senior commanders, including Vatutin and Zhukov.
In April and May 1944, Konev's 1st Ukrainian Front carried out the Iasi offensive on the Romanian approaches to the Balkans and fought a climactic battle with the German 8th Army and its Romanian allies in the Tirgu-Frumos region in early May.
In January 1945, in conjunction with Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front, he took part in the Vistula-Oder operation. Konev advanced along the Radom-Breslau axis and with overwhelming force drove back German forces, concluding the operation by the 3rd of February. Konev had managed to capture the city of Krakow with minimal damage and secured bridgeheads on the Oder River at Steinau, Breslau and Glogau. For his efforts in saving Krakow he was made an honorary citizen of the city and a monument to him was erected in one of the city squares.
On the 1st of April, Zhukov and Konev were summoned to Moscow to meet with Stalin. At the meeting Stalin asked the pair, 'who will capture Berlin, we or the allies?' Konev replied immediately, 'we will capture Berlin and we will do it before the allies.' Stalin gave the task of capturing the capital to Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front, while Konev was tasked with enveloping the south of the city on the axis Dresden-Leipzig and joining up with American forces on the Elbe. However, no line demarcating the two Front's flanks was given, leaving a certain freedom of movement for the two commanders. Konev anticipated these circumstances when issuing his orders on returning to his Front HQ from Moscow. He directed the majority of his tank forces towards Berlin and intimated that part of his right flank forces would be required to assist the 1st Belorussian Front in the capture of the city. He later wrote, 'I pictured mentally the end of the operation in the southern outskirts of Berlin. It was premature to issue such orders, but I wanted both of my tank Army commanders to share my mood and sense my confidence'. As the operation unfolded, Zhukov's failure to force an immediate breakthrough on the Seelow Heights saw Konev take a clear lead in the race towards Berlin. His Front fought a successful two-day battle between the Neisse and Upper Spree Rivers and then in a bold move, found an unmarked ford and crossed the Spree River. An example of Konev's abrasive manner towards his subordinates came to light on the 20th of April. His frustration at the slow progress of the 3rd Guards Tank Army saw him send the following message to Rybalko. 'Comrade Rybalko, you are moving like a snail. One Brigade is fighting, the rest of the Army is standing still. I order you to cross the Baruth/Luckenwalde line and deploy in battle order. Report on fulfillment!' On the 21st of April, Konev's forces completed the encirclement of the German 9th Army to the south east of the city. The following day, the 3rd Guards Tank Army had reached the southern suburbs of Berlin and on the 24th it crossed the Teltow Canal, beginning its assault into the city proper. On the 2nd of May, Konev cabled Moscow to say that his forces had captured almost the entire southwestern and central district within the demarcation line and his forward units were less than 500m from the Reichstag.
Immediately following the conclusion of the Berlin operation, Konev's Front was ordered to move south in to Czechoslovakia and capture Prague. This developed into a race with U.S. forces. Konev was involved in many meetings with American General Omar Bradley, which Konev referred to with warmth in his memoirs. However, U.S. forces liberated the western half of the country and left Prague to the Russian's, who completed its capture on the 5th of May.

The Post War Years

In June 1945, Konev was appointed Commander in Chief of the Central Group of Forces, deployed in Austria and Hungary. In April 1946, he was appointed as Commander of Land Forces and in June of the same year, following Zhukov's demotion, he replaced him as Deputy Armed Forces Minister. In 1956, as Commander in Chief of Armed Forces Warsaw Pact, he oversaw the putting down of the anti communist rising in Hungary. In 1960 left his posts and was appointed as a chief inspector of the Defense Ministry. But in 1961 he returned to a high level post as Commander in Chief of Soviet Forces Germany. He remained in this position until 1963 when he again retired. During his retirement he wrote his memoirs entitled 'Memoirs of a Front Commander'. He died of cancer in 1971 and was buried with full military honors in the Kremlin wall. During his career he was twice honored with the title a Hero of the Soviet Union and also received many other decorations including the Order of Victory.
Throughout the war Konev had, from fairly humble beginnings, become one of the most prominent Front commanders. One of his main characteristics was his careful study of the enemy. He used information gleaned at every level and taught his subordinates that the enemy must be analyzed not in the abstract, but visually. Konev was frequently seen in the front line, often under rifle or artillery fire, and he always established his command posts as close to the front line as possible and nearest to the key points in the fighting. He was also one of the first commanders to harness the use of massed artillery barrages. He taught his subordinates that it is better to launch a barrage from all your batteries that will stun your enemy, paralyze him, rather than spare the ammunition and pay for it later with the lives of many soldiers.