Von Rundstedt

The Early Years

Karl Rudolf Gerd von Rundstedt was born in Aschersleben in the Province of Saxony. Born into an aristocratic Prussian family, von Rundstedt joined the German Army in 1892and the following year was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant in the 2nd Alsation Infantry Regiment. In 1907, he joined the General Staff and made his reputation during WWI, on both the western and eastern fronts. He continued to rise through the ranks and by 1918 had reached the rank of Major.
He remained in the post war German army and as a Lieutenant Colonel, in the mid 1920's, took part in suppressing left wing and communist groups in Thuringia in central Germany. In 1926, he became Chief of Staff of the 2nd Army District at Stettin and two years later was given command of the 2nd Cavalry Division at Breslau. In 1932, following his promotion to Lieutenant General, he was appointed as commander of the 3rd Army District. This was quickly followed by promotion to General of Infantry and command of the 1st Army District at Berlin. Later that year he threatened to resign when Franz von Papen declared martial law and ordered his troops to eject members of the Nazi Party from state government offices. Von Rundstedt was dedicated to his country and the army, placing service and obedience to duty above all else. He had little time for politics and politicians, yet it suited him Despite the ensuing political turmoil, he concentrated his efforts on the regeneration of German infantry forces. He advocated the introduction of lorry borne infantry, increased firepower within infantry units and an emphasis on individual training for infantrymen at all levels. He also championed the coordination of armour and infantry forces, however as a traditional infantryman, it was possible that he was slow to appreciate the decisive effect that daring armored thrusts could achieve. In 1938, he was promoted to Colonel General and became the second most senior serving soldier in the Army. At the end of that year he resigned following the dismissal of Werner von Fritsch, Commander-in-Chief of OKH. However this retirement was short lived and in June 1939 he was recalled into service in preparation for the invasion of Poland, for which he was given command of Army Group A. His Army Group, consisting of the 10th, 14th and 8th Armies, attacked from the area of Silesia, Galicea and Slovakia. His then Chief of Staff, von Manstein, said of him in his memoirs, 'Every one of us knew him. As an exponent of grand tactics he was brilliant, a talented soldier who grasped the essentials of any problem in an instant. Indeed he would concern himself with nothing else, being indifferent to minor detail.He was a gentleman of the old school and had a charm about him to which even Hitler succumbed.'
When the campaign opened, the 14th Army was involved in heavy fighting along the Polish border and then advanced via Cracow, crossing first the Vistula and then San Rivers. The 10th Army, operating further to the north, crossed the border and closed the Radom pocket to the northeast of Kielce. The 8th Army moved in the direction of Warsaw and then cooperated with 10th Army in the battle of the Bzura River, another encirclement in the area of Zychlin. Warsaw was captured on the 27th of September and on the 1st of October Polish forces surrendered.
The succesful end of the campaign saw German forces parade through Warsaw, on the 5th of October, watched by Hitler and his entourage. Rundstedt found this most distasteful and later discribed the group as an 'Affentheater' or Monkey Theatre. For his efforts during the Polish campaign, von Runstedt was awarded the Knights Cross.
For the campaign in France and the Low Countries von Rundstedt's Army Group A was to make the decisive drive through the Ardennes and into northern France. This followed the promotion of this plan, through von Runstedt and von Manstein, to Hitler who finally became enthusued and then adopted it.
The operation progressed even better than anticipated and German forces made rapid advances. The first setback came on the 21st of May when British armored forces launched a counter attack in the area of Arras against elements of the 7th Panzer Division. The counter attack panicked some German commanders and 4th Army halted any further attacks to the west until the counter attack could be defeated and the advance of Panzer Group Kliest was also slowed. Rundstedt was also concerned about his open left flank and was expecting a counter attack from French forces. On the 23rd of May, perhaps over cautiously, he decided to close up his armored formations. Hitler was also in favor of this precaution and following consultation with Rundstedt, countermanded OKH orders, increasing the length of the halt. No resumption was made until the 27th of May, by which time British forces were in the process of escaping from the beaches at Dunkirk. After the war von Rundstedt laid the blame for the extended halt outside Dunkirk on Hitler, although the final decision on the matter was Rundstedt's, as Hitler delegated power over the matter to him and so he must share the responsibility.
During the second stage of the battle for France, his Army Group was tasked with breaking French defences on the Aisne and Marne Rivers. Following stiff resistance along the Aisne River, the Army Group made rapid advances and French forces surrendered on the 22nd of June.
Von Rundstedt was promoted to the rank of Field Marshal on the 19th of July and took part in the planning of Operation Sealion. When the invasion was called off, von Rundstedt took control of occupation forces and was given responsibility to develop the coastal defenses in the Netherlands, Belgium and France.

Barbarossa Begins

In April 1941, von Rundstedt took command of Army Group South, consisting of the 1st Panzer Group and 6th, 11th and 17th Armies. The Army Group crossed the Russian border from southern Poland and Galicea and initially made slow progress against stubborn Russian resistance. Russian forces managed to withdraw in good order from the Dniester River to the Stalin line, which was only breached on the 7th of July in the area of Zvyagel. German forces captured Berdichev and Lyuban and on the 17th of July captured Belya Tserkov. Von Rundstedt decided to switch the direction of the attack to the southeast and following the capture of Novo Arkhangelsk on the 1st of August, surrounded elements of three Russian Armies in the Uman pocket on the 3rd of August.
By the 1st of September, elements of the Army Group had captured Dnepropetrovsk and were laying siege to the Black Sea port of Odessa. On the 10th of September the 48th Panzer Corps reached the Dnepr near Kremenchug and established a small bridgehead. After heavy fighting along the Desna River, the 24th Panzer Corps encircled Russian forces in Romny on the 14th of September. Five days later the city of Kiev was captured by elements of the 29th Corps and the Southwestern Front had suffered heavy losses.
As the attack against Moscow opened further north, Von Rundstedt's Army Group was given the multiple task of reacing the Don River at Rostov, while also attempting to capture the Crimea. The 1st Panzer Group was to advance towards Rostov, while the 11th Army was to carry out the invasion of the Crimea. Von Rundstedt strongly opposed continuing the advance and advised Hitler to call a halt along the Dnepr following the capture of Kiev, but his views were rejected.
By the 28th of October, elements of the 1st Panzer Group, now reassigned the 1st Panzer Army, had reached the Mius River, while the 17th Army had reached the Donets and elements of the 6th Army had captured Kharkov. In November, von Rundstedt suffered a mild heart attack, but he refused to be hospitalized, remaining in command of the Army Group. The advance was slowed dramatically by the autumn rains and it was not until the 17th of November that the attack against Rostov began. Rostov was captured three days later, but Russian forces immediately launched strong counter attacks against elements of the 1st Panzer Army holding the city. The front could not be held with the forces available and so Rundstedt rang Hitler's HQ on December the 1st, asking for permission to abandon the city. In reply he was ordered to hold where he was. He again contacted Hitler's HQ stating, 'It is madness to attempt to hold! In the first place the troops cannot do it and in the second place, if they do not retreat they will be destroyed. I repeat that this order be rescinded, or that you find someone else to execute it!' That night the Fuhrer's reply arrived. It read, 'I am acceding to your request, please give up your command!' He was replaced by von Reichenau, who a day later was also forced to request permission to withdraw back to the line of the Mius River. This time the request was accepted.

Return to Command

Hitler recalled von Rundstedt to duty in March 1942, placing him once again in command of the western theatre. His performance in this role was lackluster, so much so that as late as the autumn of 1943, no fortifications worthy of mention existed along the entire Atlantic shore. It was only following Rommel's appointment as von Rundstedt's ostensible subordinate, that fortification work began in earnest.
During the debates preceding the landing von Rundstedt insisted that the armoured reserves should be held in the operational rear, so that they could be rushed to whatever sector the Allies chose to land in. Rommel, in contrast, insisted that the armoured forces must be deployed nearer to the coast, just beyond the reach of allied naval artillery, as the threat of allied air superiority would prevent them moving once the landings began. Rommel was likewise convinced that a landing as far west as Normandy was out of the question and that very little armour should be committed there. On this subject Rundstedt agreed with his subordinate, feeling that the allies were more likely to land in the Pas de Calais area.
Rommel's plan for the armored forces was partially accepted, because von Rundstedt's authority had all but evaporated as a result of his inactivity since his appointment. Three Panzer Divisions were given to Rommel, too few to cover all the threatened sectors, with the rest remaining in the OKW Reserve. Only three of these were deployed close enough to intervene immediately against any invasion of northern France, the other four were dispersed in southern France and the Netherlands and could only be re-deployed with Hitler's permission.
After the D-Day landings in June 1944, von Rundstedt suggested that all German forces in southern France be withdrawn to establish a new defensive line along the Loire and Orne Rivers and the Panzer Divisions be made available to mount a counter attack against the allied bridgeheads. However this was politically unacceptable to Hitler and he refused to authorize the plan. On the 1st of July a counter attack against the British at Caen failed. That night when von Rundstedt repoted the failure to OKW HQ, he was asked by an exasperated Keitel, 'what shall we do? what shall we do?' to which Rundstedt replied, 'make peace you fools! What else can you do?' This untactful remark was not well received and the following day Rundstedt was removed from command and replaced by von Kluge.
As a result of the July 20th Plot, which outraged von Rundstedt, he agreed to join Guderian and Wilhelm Keitel on the Army Court of Honour that expelled hundreds of officers suspected of being opposed to Hitler, often on the flimsiest of evidence. This removed them from the jurisdiction of the military and many were executed.
In mid-August 1944, von Kluge committed suicide and von Rundstedt was once again placed in command in the west. German forces were in disorganized retreat and the calming hand of von Rundstedt was required. In one of his more impressive achievements, he imposed a rapid reorganization and re-established a stable and almost continual front.
In December German forces were to mount their final offensive action in the west, operation 'Wacht am Rhein.' Although he was Commander of Western Forces, the plan was devised by Hitler. Von Rundstedt later said, 'when I received the plan in early November, I was staggered. Hitler had not troubled to consult me about its possibilities. It was obvious to me that the forces available were not sufficient for such an extremely ambitious plan. As early as December 24th, when German forces had failed to capture the important communications center of Bastogne, Runstedt urged Hitler to halt the offensive. He was relieved of command once again in March 1945, after telling Keitel that Hitler should make peace with the Allies, rather than continue to fight a hopeless war.

The Post War Years

Rundstedt was captured by the American 36th Infantry Division on May 1st 1945. While being interrogated after his capture he suffered another heart attack, and was taken to Britain, where he was held in captivity in a POW Camp in South Wales. He was charged by the British as a war criminal. The charges against him concerned his involvement in mass murders in occupied Soviet territories. On October 10th 1941, his subordinate, Walther von Reichenau issued his infamous 'Reichenau Order.' Upon receiving a copy Rundstedt, much impressed, immediately reissued the order to his other army commanders, presenting it as a model of those that he expected them to issue to their troops. Ultimately he never faced trial, allegedly because of his poor health, though the American prosecution team suspected that political considerations underlay the British decision. He was released in July 1948, and lived in Hanover until his death in 1953.