Erich Von Manstein

The Early Days

Erich Von Manstein was born in Berlin in 1887. In 1906, aged 19, he joined an infantry Regiment and by the beginning of WWI he had reached the rank of lieutenant. In 1915 he attended the War Academy and following his graduation he returned to his Regiment where he fulfilled a number of Staff positions until the wars end. In 1927 he was promoted to Major and then gradually climbed through the ranks. By 1937 he had reached the rank of Colonel and was appointed Head of Operations Department of the General Staff. Two years later in 1937 he was promoted to Major General and appointed as Deputy Chief of the General Staff. In 1938 he was given command of the 18th Infantry Division. In 1939 prior to the invasion of Poland, he was appointed as the Chief of Staff for Army Group A, under Von Rundstedt. Following the successful completion of the Polish campaign he devised the 'Ardennes Plan' for the invasion of France. His plan was eventually accepted, but just before the campaign began he was given command of 38th Corps, part of 2nd Army, under Von Weichs. Despite his Corps being part of the reserve for the operation, he handled it skillfully and made considerable advances. Following the conclusion of operations in France he was promoted to General and awarded the Knight's Cross. Following his promotion he was given command of the 56th Motorized Corps, part of 4th Panzer Gruppe under Höpner, in preparation for the invasion of Russia.

Barbarossa

Following the opening of the campaign he pushed his Corps almost 150 miles in five days, from the Momel to the Dvinsk River. He ignored his open flanks gambling that his continued movement would prevent the Russians from manouvering to attack them. He continued past the Dvinsk, towards the Daugava, where he was at last ordered to halt and wait for the units on his flank, who were trailing some sixty miles in his wake, to catch up.
In August 1941 his Corps was transferred to join Busch's 16th Army, which was experiencing stubborn Russian resistance in the Novgorod area of northern Russia. He was tasked with assisting 10th Corps, which was in trouble in the Staraya Russa sector. He achieved this by implementing a series of skilful attacks, which were carried out by his 3rd Motorized and SS Totenkopf Divisions. He managed to roll up the flanks of the Russian 34th Army and force it back across the Lovat River. This enabled 10th Corps to renew its advance and the two Corps then combined to smash what remained of the 34th Army.

Capturing The Crimea

In September he was given command of 11th Army, following the death of its commander, Von Schobert, in an air crash. He was tasked with both capturing the Crimea and also driving towards Rostov on the Don River. This was somewhat over ambitious, as Manstein had very little armour and was forced to split his Army Group in order to achieve the two objectives. His first assault on the Crimea stalled following a Russian attack against the Rumanian 3rd Army and his own 30th Corps. The Russian penetration became so serious that he found himself in danger of being cut off on the Nogay Steppe. However Von Kleist's 1st Panzer Gruppe came to his aid, halting the Russian forces and then in turn surrounding them between Mariupol and Bardyansk. At the end of October Manstein was ordered to concentrate on the Crimea alone. On the 1st of November Simferopol was captured, but by the end of the month Russian resistance had stiffened. At the end of December the Russians managed to put ashore considerable reinforcements in a series of sea borne landings at Kerch and Feodosiya. The only Division remaining in the Kerch Peninsula, the 46th, was forced to evacuate it to prevent becoming cut off. Following the division's withdrawal to Vladislavovka, the Russians recaptured the peninsula and Manstein, following his promotion to Colonel-General on the 1st of January, was forced to go over to the defensive until May.
On the 8th of May he began his attempt to regain the peninsula. With the use of extensive deception, he had convinced the Russians that he would mount his attack against a prominent bulge in the north of the peninsula. But when he actually attacked in the south they were caught of guard. The attack was a success and by the 11th his panzers had reached Ak Monay on the Sea of Azov cutting off ten Russian Divisions. On the 16th of May, Kerch itself was captured.
He now turned his attention to the fortress city of Sevastopol. The garrison consisted of ten Russian Divisions in well prepared defensive positions and a series of forts. Manstein proposed the concentrated use of artillery, including specialized assault artillery, and numerous bombing sorties to be flown by the Luftwaffe, in order to destroy the Russian positions and reduce the number of casualties to his ground forces. However on the 2nd of June he was almost killed whilst carrying out a reconnaissance of the city by boat. It was strafed by a Russian fighter and several of the crew died.
The attack against Sevastopol itself began on the 7th of June. The Germans managed to break through the first defence line, but sustained heavy casualties in doing so. On the 17th of June a fresh attack was launched and gradually the forts were cleared. By the 20th of June, German forces were in control of the harbor, and on the night of 27th June assault parties in boats attacked the town itself. By the 3rd of July Sevastopol had fallen. Manstein had achieved a notable victory. Against a determined enemy and in difficult terrain, he had pulled off a remarkable success. His reward was promotion to Field Marshal on the 1st of July.

Holding The Don River

On the 27th of November Manstein was given command of the newly formed Army Group Don. This consisted of Paulus's encircled 6th Army at Stalingrad, Hoth's 4th Panzer Army, the 3rd Rumanian Army, two Corps from the 4th Rumanian Army and Combat Group Hollidt, a mixed German-Rumanian force on the Chir River.
Manstein was ordered to hold the Don - Chir front at all costs, and prevent further Russian breakthroughs towards Rostov. In addition he was to assist with the rescue of 6th Army at Stalingrad, operation 'Winter Storm'. He arrived at his new Army Group HQ on the 24th of November, his 55th birthday. The same day he signaled to Paulus: 'Shall do everything in my power to relieve you. In the meantime it is imperative that 6th Army, while holding Volga and north front in compliance with the Fuhrer's orders, clear a supply channel towards the south west.' Three days later he told Colonel Wenck, the new Chief of Staff of 3rd Rumanian Army: 'Wenck, you'll answer to me with your head if the Russians break through to Rostov. The Don-Chir front must hold! Otherwise not only the 6th Army in Stalingrad, but the whole of Army Group A in the Caucasus will be lost.'
Manstein entrusted Hoth with making the breakthrough to Stalingrad, using the 57th Panzer Corps. However assembly delays postponed the start of the advance from the 3rd to the 12th of December. Hoth's tank divisions were under strength and had to cover sixty miles to reach Stalingrad. By the 20th of December his leading forces reached the Mishkova River, some thirty-five miles from the city, only to be halted by stiff Russian resistance. Meanwhile the situation on the Chir Front was such that Manstein could not move any forces west of the Don towards Stalingrad. The situation worsened on the 16th of December when the Russians launched an attack against Manstein's left flank. It broke through the 8th Italian Army's positions on the Don. The Italian forces withdrew in disorder, abandoning many crucial supply concentrations and almost all their heavy equipment. On the 24th of December, the Russians captured the airfield at Tatsinskaya, the main forward air base that had been supplying Stalingrad. Manstein was forced to use the 48th Panzer Corps to close the gap. The situation was extremely serious, if the Russians broke through to Rostov, Manstein's Army Group would be cut off as would Kleist's Army Group A in the Caucasus.
Manstein told Hitler that the situation on his left wing required an immediate redeployment of forces and therefore the relief of 6th Army would have to be postponed indefinitely. The only remaining alternative was the earliest possible breakout of 6th Army. Although Hitler agreed with the redeployment of Manstein's forces, he insisted that the relief attempt must be resumed as soon as possible. He refused to authorize a break out by 6th Army, following Paulus's report that his tanks only had enough fuel to move twelve miles.
On the 24th of December the Russians attacked again west of the Don. The Rumanians on Hoth's right gave way, and during the next three days Hoth's force was driven back from the Myshkova, and finally back to its starting point in the Kolelnikovo area. By the 27th of December, Russian motorized forces threatened to surround Army Group Don and to cut off Army Group A. The next day Hitler reluctantly agreed to a general withdrawal by both to the Mius River line, some 150 miles west of Stalingrad. Mainstein would later write: 'The situation of the two Army Groups, Don and A, would have taken a disastrous turn if Paulus had surrendered at the beginning of January'.
On the 17th of February Hitler visited Manstein at his headquarters, initially intending to dismiss him for allowing the evacuation of Kharkov against his orders. However, once the seriousness of the situation had been explained Hitler relented. Despite Hitlers insistence on the immediate recapture of Kharkov, Manstein outlined his proposal for a counteroffensive against the Russians who had got to within thirty miles of the Dnepr. Before Hitler departed on the 19th, he finally concented to Manstein's plan.

Manstein's Counter Blow

While Army Group Hollidt managed to hold the Mius positions, despite constant pressure from Russian forces, Manstein moved the 1st and 4th Panzer Army's over to his northern flank. The 1st Panzer Army cut off and then destroyed Mobile Group Popov, which had penetrated into the Krasnoarmeyskoye area. Further north the 4th Panzer Army moved against the Russian 1st Guards and 6th Armies. It trapped the forward elements of 6th Army in a pincer movement which joined at Pavlograd and further east cut off the lead elements of the 1st Guards Army to the west of Pavlograd. In a vain effort to assist the withdrawal of 6th Army to the northeast, a combat group assembled from 3rd Tank Army attacked southwards in a bid to deflect the SS Panzer Corps and protect Kharkov. However the Russian force was pinned west of Bereka and encircled on the 3rd of March. Relentless air attacks by the Luftwaffe savaged the forces trapped in the pocket. Following the destruction of the 3rd Army combat group near Bereka, the SS Panzer Corps advanced towards Kharkov from the west and reached the western suburbs on the 8th of March. Several days of heavy fighting ensued and Russian forces in the city surrendered on the on the 15th.
After the capture of Kharkov the SS Panzer Corps pushed on towards Belgorod. The Russian 69th Army, which was defending the city, was unable to offer any organised resistance. It began to withdraw to avoid encirclement on the 17th March and the SS Panzer Corps entered the city the following day. In recognition for his action, on March 14th 1943, Manstein was awarded the Oak Leaves to his Knight's Cross.

Kursk

The next major operation to involve Manstein was the offensive against the Kursk salient, operation Citadel. Manstein felt that commencement of the operation had been left too late, as indeed it had. Manstein in the south had eighteen divisions and relied upon his tanks to lead the assault. When the operation finally got under way, several weeks late on the 4th of July, the Russians were ready for it. Manstein in the south, using Hoth's 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf, won hard earned gains with his tanks and had the Russians at a disadvantage. Losses were heavy on both sides, but Manstein was convinced that he was on the verge of breaking the Russians resistance. However Hitler called a halt to the offensive due to the Allied invasion of Sicily. Manstein protested that 'Victory on the southern front of the Kursk salient is within reach. The enemy has thrown in nearly his entire strategic reserve and is badly mauled. Breaking off the action now would be throwing away victory'. But Hitler would not agree and merely allowed Manstein to continue on his own until the 17th of July when the offensive was finally abandoned.
On the 3rd of September 1943 Manstein flew to East Prussia and presented vital requests to Hitler. He appealed for the appointment of a single C-in-C for the Eastern front, with overriding powers and the creation of a new integrated command under a single Chief of Staff responsible for all theatres of war. This was unacceptable to Hitler and he rejected the proposals out of hand. He also refused to authorize the withdrawal of Manstein's Army Group behind the Dnepr River, despite Manstein's warning that the Russians were preparing for an offensive. He merely allowed Manstein to give up the Kuban bridgehead, moving the 17th Army to the Crimea and withdrawing the 6th Army from the Mius River to the 'Tortoise Line'. He refused to allow units to be transferred from other theatres to strengthen the forces in Russia following the Allied landings in southern Italy.

Retreat to the Dnepr

On the 8th of September Hitler flew to Manstein's Army Group headquarters to discuss matters, which he realized were serious. Again Manstein requested that his Army Group be pulled back behind the Dnepr, in order to shorten the front. Hitler refused, but did promise Manstein eight divisions to reinforce the Dnepr crossings and consolidate the front beyond them. However the Divisions were not released and the next day Manstein telephoned Zeitzler to warn him that: 'any time now the Russians will make a disastrous breakthrough to the Dnepr.' He ended by saying: 'if some foresight had been shown and the reinforcements, now made indispensable by the situation, had been made available in good time, the present crisis, which may well lead to the final decision in the East and hence of the war generally, would have been avoided.' This was clear and open criticism of the Fuhrer's leadership. It was commonly known that Manstein secretly held little respect for the Fuhrer. As a joke his pet dachshund, Knirps, was trained to raise its right paw in salute on hearing the command 'Heil Hitler'.
On the 14th of September came the expected Russian breakthrough towards Kiev, Kremenchug and Cherkassy. Without waiting for Hitler's orders Manstein immediately withdrew the 8th Army and the 1st Panzer Army towards the Dnepr and ordered the withdrawal the next day of the 4th Panzer Army on both sides of Kiev to prevent it being encircled and destroyed in front of the river. Hitler immediately summoned Manstein to see him. The Field Marshal told Hitler: 'What is at stake now is no longer the holding of the Dnepr line or of the economically important regions of the Donbas, my Fuhrer, but the fate of the entire Eastern front.' At last Hitler agreed that Manstein should withdraw behind the Dnepr and the Desna Rivers.
He had now to supervise, across a 450 mile front, a withdrawal of three of his four Armies. They would have to withdraw several hundred miles under fierce attack and then using six bridges cross over the largest river in Europe. It was a tremendous undertaking, but one that Manstein handled with his usual flair.
In October the Russians recaptured Zaporozhye and then in November Kiev. The same month Zhitomir, the main supply area for Hoth's 4th Panzer Army, was taken. In desperate counter-attacks Manstein's forces stabilized the front north of Zhitomir at Korosten and recaptured the area between Zhitomir and Fastov.

Holding on in the Ukraine

By December 1943 Army Group South had withdrawn some 250 miles across its whole front. The Russians captured the northern stretch of the Dnepr bend and on the 29th of December Manstein withdrew the 1st Panzer Army northwards to join 4th Panzer Army on the threatened flank. On the 4th of January 1944 Manstein flew to persuade Hitler to abandon the Cherkassy salient in the Dnepr bend entirely and to pull back the southern wing of his Army Group, even if this meant giving up the Crimea. Hitler refused.
In February 1944 over six German divisions were trapped in the Cherkassy salient. Manstein acted on reports from within the pocket ordered an immediate breakout to the southwest. In terrible weather only half the encircled men managed to fight their way back to safety, though without all their heavy equipment.
Manstein now expected a full-scale Russian offensive towards Poland on his northern sector. He moved his headquarters to Lvov on the Polish border, expecting the worst attack to come between his own Army Group and Army Group Centre. But when the Russian attack did come, on the 4th of March, it came along the whole of the front. Zhukov's 1st Ukrainian Front, attacked Manstein's northern wing, and tore a hole in 4th Panzer Army. Manstein had held two Panzer Corps in readiness for just such an emergency and by forming hedgehog defences and mounting counterattacks they managed to stabilize the situation.
Meanwhile to the south, the weakened 8th Army could not contain a strong attack by Konev's 2nd Ukrainian Front, which captured Uman and then crossed first the Bug and then the Dnestr Rivers. The rear of Manstein's Army Group was now under threat and the 1st Panzer Army was trapped in a large pocket between the Bug and the Dnestr. On the 23rd of March, Manstein asked Hitler for reinforcements so that he could re-establish contact with 1st Panzer Army, which was being supplied partly by air, but also remaining mobile to avoid encirclement. Hitler replied, ordering that: '1st Panzer Army will hold its front on the Bug and re-establish its severed rearward communications by its own efforts.' Manstein was furious, he replied: 'The order to hold on and yet to simultaneously to seal the gap between 1st and 4th Panzer Armies is unrealisable. Please inform the Fuhrer that I shall give 1st Panzer Army the order to break out unless I have his binding assurance by 15:00 hours today that reinforcements will be sent to me.' Determined to avoid another disaster, Manstein was delivering an ultimatum. An hour later he received his reply. Whilst 1st Panzer Army would be allowed to break out westwards he must hold his entire front as before. On the 25th of March Manstein was summoned to the Fuhrer's HQ at Berchtesgaden. Manstein explained that 1st Panzer must be allowed to move west to link up with 4th Panzer Army and close the gap that had been breached. He also requested at least one panzer corps to reinforce 4th Panzer Army with. Hitler refused the request for reinforcements saying the whole scheme was pointless and that 1st Panzer Army must resolve the problems in its rear area by its own efforts. He then complained that as for Manstein, all he did was fall back. Manstein retorted that Hitler himself was solely to blame. He complained that for eight months he had been given one strategically insoluble task after another, with neither adequate reinforcements nor freedom of movement. It was almost unheard of for someone to criticize Hitler so openly. Hitler refused to make a decision on the spot and walked out, whereupon Manstein told Schmundt, Head of Army Personnel, that if Hitler could not agree with his views, then the Fuhrer must find another Army Group commander. After some time Hitler returned and gave in to Manstein's requests. In a changed mood he even promised him three divisions to reinforce 4th Panzer Army. By the 9th of April, 1st Panzer Army, after travelling 150 miles west had joined up with 4th Panzer Army. Although considerable amounts of heavy equipment and supplies were lost, the breach had been eliminated.
For this brilliant achievement, Manstein's reward was to be summoned to Berchtesgaden to be dismissed. He was decorated with the Swords to the Knight's Cross as a sop, but Hitler told him: 'The time for operating is over, what I need now is men who stand firm.'

Conclusion

Manstein was trusted by his staff and by his commanders as a man who thought carefully. He only took risks when he felt them justified and usually managed to out think the enemy. His peers regarded with near unanimity that Manstein was their finest brain and best commander and this has been echoed by military commentators from the Allied countries.
Blumentritt called Manstein 'the most brilliant strategist of all our generals'. Westphal wrote: 'of all the officers of the General Staff, von Manstein possessed the greatest strategic and general military gifts. Forward-looking, always full of new and often brilliant ideas, an organizer of genius, a difficult subordinate and a generous superior, he was always in the front rank where the interests of the Army were at stake'. Liddell Hart stated: 'the ablest of all the German generals was probably Field Marshal Erich von Manstein. That was the verdict of most of those with whom I discussed the war, from Rundstedt downwards'.
Manstein's favourite tactic was to allow a Russian penetration in a particular area and then encircle the attackers when they had been lulled into complacency. This successful ruse showed that he did not think merely in terms of fixed lines. When taxed with losing Kharkov, Manstein said: 'I'd rather lose a city than an Army'.
Hitler's own opinion of Manstein, given to Jodl in 1944, was this: 'In my eyes Manstein has a tremendous talent for operations, there's no doubt about that. If I had an army of twenty divisions at full strength and in peace time conditions, I couldn't think of a better commander for them than Manstein. He knows how to handle them. He would move like lightning, but always under the condition that he has first-class material, petrol and plenty of ammunition. If something breaks down he doesn't get things done. If I got hold of another army today I'm not at all sure that I wouldn't employ Manstein, because he is certainly one of our most competent officers. He can operate with divisions as long as they are in good shape. If the divisions are roughly handled I have to take them away from him in a hurry, he can't handle such a situation.' This is less than just to Manstein, who constantly had to fight with under-strength formations. He was of the opinion that it was still possible to force a stalemate on the Eastern front, but his plans involved withdrawals that Hitler would not countenance. He told Hitler before his dismissal that: 'his divisions had been giving their best under his command and that no one else could get them to give anything more' and he was proved right.
After the war von Manstein was tried as a war criminal. He was charged with seventeen offences, including responsibility for the execution of Jews in Poland and Russia, the deportation of civilian populations, the distribution and execution of Hitler's Commissar order and unjustified reprisals against, partisans. Only two of the charges were substantiated and he was found accountable on seven others, which, very questionably, were modified after his defence had closed. It emerged after the trial that most right-thinking military commentators thought Manstein had conducted himself very well as a commander and that far from instigating any policies of brutality he had done his best to make life more tolerable for the Russians in his occupied areas. It would have been impossible for Manstein to personally to supervise the whole of the vast areas under his control and undoubtedly atrocities did occur, but Manstein was not the sort of man to countenance them. Nevertheless, the court found him guilty on two charges and he was sentenced to eighteen years imprisonment. This sentence provoked opposition from some distinguished quarters, which included Liddell Hart, who wrote a letter to The Times newspaper in Manstein's defence. The letter ended: 'I have studied the records of warfare long enough to realize how few men who have commanded armies in a hard struggle could have come through such a searching examination of their deeds and words as well as Von Manstein did.' The original sentence was reduced greatly and Von Manstein was released in 1952. Following his release he wrote his memoirs 'Lost Victories' which were published in 1955, followed by 'From a Soldier's Life 1887-1939'. in 1958. He died in Bavaria in 1973.