Operation Mars November-December 1942

Situation

With the German summer offensive stalled in the ruins of Stalingrad and on the slopes of the Caucasus Mountains, STAVKA sought to regain the strategic initiative on the Eastern Front. Operation Mars was to be executed in unison with Operation Uranus, the code name for the Stalingrad counteroffensive. Named after the Roman God of War, Operation Mars formed the centrepiece of Russian strategic designs in the autumn of 1942. Its scale and ambitious strategic intent made Operation Mars at least as important as Operation Uranus and likely more important.
German Army Group Centre, whose forces had been lodged in the Rzhev salient since the winter of 1941-42, were menacingly close to Moscow and still posed a serious threat to the city. The 150km square salient contained the German Ninth Army and had been heavily fortified. It contained the key cities of Rzhev, Belyi, and Sychevka and was flanked by the Molodoi Tud, Luchesa, Osuga and Vazusa Rivers.
Russian forces assembled to reduce the salient included the Kalinin and Western Fronts, supported by elements of the Moscow Defence Zone. The operational plan required Western Front's 20th and 31st Armies, supported by 29th Army, to make the main attack against German defences along the Osuga and Vazusa Rivers northeast of Sychevka. A cavalry-mechanized group formed by the 6th Tank and 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps, was to exploit any breakthrough, capture Sychevka, roll up the German defences from the south, and link up with 41st Army attacking eastward from the Belyi region. Simultaneously the Kalinin Front was to conduct its main attack south of Belyi with 41st Army and along the Luchesa River north of Belyi with 22nd Army. In conjunction, the 39th Army would launch a secondary assault at the northern extremity of the salient, across the Molodoi Tud River toward Olenino. Once a penetration was achieved, the 1st and 2d Mechanized Corps would exploit eastward and link up to the west of Sychevka with 20th Army's cavalry-mechanized group. To maximize pressure on the Germans, the Russian forces would attack simultaneously in all sectors. By launching his main attacks against the base of the Rzhev salient from both east and west, Zhukov sought to envelop the German forces with frontal assaults and without having to conduct complex manoeuvre with his mobile forces across the difficult terrain and in the harsh weather conditions.
A successful conclusion of Operation Mars was to be followed by Operation Jupiter. In this operation, the Western Front's heavily reinforced 5th and 33rd Armies, deployed astride the Moscow-Vyazma road, would penetrate German defences east of Vyazma. The 9th and 10th Tank Corps, followed by 3d Guards Tank Army, would then capture Vyazma, link up with Kalinin Front forces and, if possible, continue the attack toward Smolensk.
In preparation, the Germans had fortified the rivers flanking the salient and had cleared timber from the main north-south and east-west roads and rail lines, which traversed the salient. Although heavy forests and swamps dominated the terrain in the western and central regions, the Germans had cleared sufficient terrain to permit both firm defence and the manoeuvre of mobile reserves within it. In addition, by late October, the dirt roads and many rivers criss-crossing the salient should be frozen or close to frozen.

The Eastern Flank

The offensive began early on the 25th of November, opening simultaneously against the eastern, western, and northern flanks of the salient. Preceded by a vicious artillery preparation, infantry and tanks of the Western Front's 20th and 31st Armies' struck the defensive positions of the German 39th Panzer Corps along the Vazusa and Osuga Rivers. The 31st Army led its attack with the 88th, 336th, and 239th Rifle Divisions, supported by the 332nd and 145th Tank Brigades. Although the Germans had expected an attack, the assault caught them at an awkward moment, with the 78th Infantry Division in the midst of relieving elements of the 5th Panzer Division along the Vazusa River. Despite the numerical superiority of the attacking force and the initial German confusion, the attack achieved only limited results due to the strong defences. The Russian forces had to assault across generally open terrain and fog and driving snow showers combined to reduce the effectiveness of the artillery preparation.
North of the Osuga River, the German 102nd Infantry Division successfully repelled repeated assaults by the 31st Army. In the sector between the Osuga and Vazusa Rivers, the 102nd Division's 195th Infantry Regiment, repulsed the attacks of the 326th, 42nd Guards and 251st Rifle Divisions, which were supported by the 25th and 93rd Tank Brigades. The Russian infantry advanced in echelon, their ranks interspersed with supporting tanks. German artillery, machine guns, and small arms fire tore gaping holes in the ranks of the assaulting infantry as antitank weapons picked off the accompanying tanks. The Russian assault continued for three days, but was finally halted following heavy losses.
The attack by the 20th Army between the Vazusa and Osuga Rivers also achieved little success. Despite strong armoured support, the attacks again stalled after suffering heavy losses.
However, at the southern edge of the salient, along the banks of the frozen Vazusa River, a single rifle Division from the 20th Army achieved a limited success. Taking advantage of the Germans initial confusion, the 247th Rifle Division, supported by a tank brigade of about 50 tanks, lunged across the frozen Vazusa River, breaking through the forward German positions and seized two villages on the river's western bank. Exploiting the opportunity, the 331st Rifle Division was also moved across the river and into the breech. Fierce fighting raged all day as the Russian infantry struggled to expand the bridgehead. By the end of the day the size of the bridgehead remained too small to provide a satisfactory jumping off position for further offensive actions. However, the following day, the 8th Guards Rifle Corps and the 6th Tank and 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps pushed into the breech to attempt to enlarge the bridgehead and exploit the operation westward. The 8th Guards Rifle Corps consisted of the 26th Guards Rifle Division, the 148th and 150th Rifle Brigades, and the 11th and 18th Tank Brigades. This decision however, turned out to be ill advised, as the hard-pressed German forces offered stubborn and desperate resistance. The 5th Panzer and 78th Infantry Division's formed small combat groups in Company and Battalion strength and fiercely defended the numerous villages in the area west of the Vazusa River. The 39th Panzer Corps ordered its reserve, the 9th Panzer Division, to move east from the area of Sychevka and plug the developing breeches.
On the night of the 25th of November, while the Russian forces attempted to expand their tenuous bridgehead, the 8th Guards Rifle Corps and the 6th Tank and 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps struggled forward. Under constant German artillery fire, they moved along two frozen dirt roads through the light forests toward the crossings. The infantry and tanks of the 8th Guards Rifle Corps clogged the crossing sites over the Vazusa, as harried army staff officers tried in vain to clear the way for the advancing armour and cavalry of 6th Tank and 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps. It was an impossible task and movement at the crossing ground to halt. Although the rifle Corps made it across the river, the tank and cavalry Corps were stranded on the eastern bank. It was mid-day on the 26th of November before the tanks of the 6th tank Corps could go into action.
On the 27th, as German reserves from the 9th Panzer Division manoeuvred into blocking positions along the critical Rzhev-Sychevka road, elements of the 5th Panzer and 78th Infantry Division defended their fortified village strong points, severely disrupting the attempted exploitation. In the afternoon, the 22nd and 20th Tank Brigades and 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 6th Tank Corps crossed the vital Rzhev-Sychevka road despite suffering heavy losses. Elements of the 2nd and 3rd Guards Cavalry Divisions and the entire 20th Cavalry Division also made it across the road, but suffered frightening losses in the process. The Germans responded by counterattacking from the north and south along the Rzhev-Sychevka road against the exposed flanks of the exploiting Russian forces.
By nightfall on the 28th of November, the Russian attack had faltered and although the bulk of the 6th tank Corps and three cavalry Divisions had reached the forests across the Rzhev-Sychevka road, German counterattacks along the Rzhev road had slammed the door on their withdrawal. Worse still, they were no longer within the range of supporting artillery, as there was no room for it in the bridgehead. The trapped Russian forces were ordered to organize a breakout to the west during the night of the 28th of November.

The Western Flank

Meanwhile, in the Belyi and Luchesa River sectors along the western flank of the Rzhev salient, the 41st and 22nd Army's had made striking progress in the first three days of battle and appeared close to reaching deep into the German rear area.
The 41st Army had opened their offensive at 09:00 hours on the 25th of November, after a heavy artillery preparation had smashed the German forward defences to the south of Belyi. Advancing in a driving snowstorm across the frozen, forested swamps, into the more open terrain along the main Belyi-Dukhovshchina dirt road, the 6th Stalin Volunteer Rifle Corps, supported by tank detachments from the 1st Mechanized Corps, easily overcame forward German defences, occupying several of the villages along the road and the Vishenka River in the German rear area. At dawn the next day, the 1st mechanized Corps continued its advance, with the 65th and 219th Tank Brigades in the lead. Moving slowly through the heavy and virtually road less forests, by nightfall it had torn a hole 20km wide and nearly 30km deep in the German defences, reaching the Belyi-Vladimirskoe road.
However the 41st Army was drawn into a prolonged and difficult battle to capture the town of Belyi, which was defended by the 246th Infantry Division. It was also supported by a kampfgruppe each from Panzer Grenadier Division Grossdeutschland and the 1st Panzer Division. The 150th Rifle Division attacked the city's southern defences, and when this assault failed, it was reinforced by the 19th Mechanized Brigade. However despite all efforts, Belyi could not be taken.
Meanwhile, an attempt was made to sever the crucial Belyi-Vladimirskoe road, which ran northwest into Belyi and was the only available German re-supply route into the city. However the 1st Panzer Division's 113th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, which was deployed along the critical supply artery, thwarted all attempts to cut the road.
Also on the 25th of November, the 22nd Army's 3rd Mechanized Corps, had attacked eastward up the Luchesa River valley, along a narrow corridor flanked by forests and frozen swamps. Russian forces tore a wide hole in the German defences and continued to drive eastward up the valley. The Russian 185th and 238th Rifle Division's, forced back the German 86th Infantry Division and punctured the German front at the junction of the 41st Panzer and the 23rd Army Corps.
The German 23rd Army Corps responded by committing its only available reserve, the Grossdeutschland Division's Grenadier Regiment, into the fray to slow the Russian advance. Heavy fighting raged for possession of the key village of Starukhi as Russian forces drove towards the Olenino-Belyi road in an attempt to support 41st Army's advance further south.
On the 28th of November, the 47th Mechanized Brigade attacked to the east of Belyi in yet another attempt to envelop the city. While elements of the 1st Panzer Division held Belyi and the Belyi-Vladimirskoe road, the 12th, 20th, and 19th Panzer Divisions were moved in the salient to reinforce its defence.
Although the Germans were unable to close the gap created by the 22nd Army's attack, the often impenetrable terrain, deteriorating weather, and skilful German defence took a heavy toll on the advancing Russian force and halted them short of their objective, the key Olenino-Belyi road. By the 30th of November, the Russian salient was 8km wide and almost 15km deep.

The Northern Flank

Along the northern extremity of the salient, on the 25th of November, the 39th Army launched a secondary attack in the Molodoi Tud area, with the 373rd, 135th, and 158th Rifle Divisions, supported by the 28th and 81st Tank Brigades. When the main attack bogged down, attacks were mounted on the flanks with four rifle brigades, the 100th and 117th on the right and the 136th and 101st on the left, supported by the 28th and 29th Tank Regiments. The 100th Rifle Brigade managed to break through the German 253rd Infantry Division's defences southwest of the city and advanced 5km into the German rear. A skilful counterattack by two Battalions from the Grossdeutschland Division's Grenadier Regiment and elements of the 14th Motorized Division, halted the Russian advance. Thereafter, the Grossdeutschland's two Battalions speedily regrouped to meet the Russian attack in the Luchesa River valley.
By the 30th of November, this struggle too had degenerated into a series of desperate Russian attacks, which achieved only limited gains. The defending 206th Infantry and 14th Motorized Divisions were forced to conduct some tactical withdrawals but, nevertheless, maintained a continuous defence line, which denied the Russian forces their objective, the Olenino-Rzhev road and rail line.

Stalemate

The overall situation by the 30th of November was such that the Western Front's main attack in the Sychevka sector had clearly faltered. Although elements of the 20th Army had secured a foothold over the Vazusa River and occupied precarious positions astride the critical Rzhev-Sychevka road, the 31st Army's attack had utterly failed, and the 29th Army had not yet joined the assault. Nevertheless, both the 41st and 22nd Armies had made significant gains.
Attempts were begun to reinforce the 20th Army with the reserve Divisions from the 31st Army and to withdraw the mobile group from its exposed position west of the Rzhev-Sychevka road. After this regrouping, the assault was to continue. Meanwhile, the two Kalinin Front armies to the west of the Rzhev salient would develop their attacks in support of the 20th Army.

Defeat

Having failed to exploit opportunities west of the Rzhev-Sychevka road and now starved of ammunition and logistical support, the 6th Tank Corps and cooperating cavalry had no choice but to attempt a breakout to the east. On the night of the 29th of November, the force launched a desperate breakout attempt in coordination with fierce Russian attacks from within the Vazusa River bridgehead. In bitter and chaotic fighting which saw the Russian force sustain heavy casualties, the bulk of the Corps broke out of the encirclement, despite losing most of its armour and heavy equipment.
On the west side of the salient, the 41st Army's seemingly certain victory soon degenerated into a catastrophic rout, and 22nd Army faced a frustrating stalemate.
To the south of Belyi, German forces mounted a counterattack on the 1st of December. The 1st Panzer and the newly arrived 12th Panzer Division's, regained firm control of the Belyi-Vladimirskoe road, cut off and destroyed the isolated 47th Mechanized Brigade northeast of Belyi, and began applying unremitting pressure to the Russian defence lines southeast of the city. Even more threatening, the 19th and 20th Panzer Division's, began concentrating to the south of Belyi. By the 6th of December, they were in a position to strike back at the Russian 41st Army. They did so on the morning of the 7th of December, against the 41st Army's southern flank, while the 1st Panzer Division and the Grossdeutschland Division's Fusilier Regiment attacked southward from Belyi. In three days of intense fighting, the combined German force slashed through the 41st Army's rear area and encircled the bulk of the army southeast of Belyi.
Further north in the Luchesa valley, the 22nd Army lacked the strength to expand its sizable penetration and although intense fighting ebbed and flowed for several days, a stalemate ensued. The 39th Army also continued its slow progress at the northern apex of the salient against strong German resistance. But having suffered heavy losses, it faced little chance of making further progress.
Between the 2nd and 10th of December, the 22nd Army was reinforced with the 5th Tank Corps and with several divisions from the 31st Army, the 6th Tank Corps was reconstituted with tanks received from the STAVKA reserve, and the 29th Army was also heavily reinforced. While the fighting raged on at Belyi, the 20th and 29th Armies were ordered to resume their assaults. On the 11th of December, in unison with a fresh drive in the north by the 39th Army, which was reinforced with a number of Divisions from the 30th Army.
The initial assault was launched from the Vazusa River bridgehead on the morning of the 11th of December. At 10:10 hours massed infantry from the 20th and 29th Armies, resumed their attacks under heavy German fire. Attacking recklessly across a 4km sector, against heavily reinforced German antitank defences. The desperate assault saw 20th Army lose almost 300 tanks in two days of incessant combat and the attack broke down along the majority of the penetration front. Then, the 5th Tank Corps was committed to the battle, its armour desperately trying to penetrate the enemy defences. The tank assaults gave way to furious enemy counterattacks and individual heights and key positions changed hands several times, with both sides suffering heavy losses. The assaults continued for three days, before collapsing in utter exhaustion on the 15th of December.
The 41st Army's encircled force of about 40,000 men held out to the southeast of Belyi for as long as possible. Finally, the unrelenting pressure by the four encircling German panzer Divisions and dwindling supplies forced the group's commander, General Solomatin to act. He orchestrated a breakout on the night of the 15th of December, destroying his armour and heavy weapons, then thrusting westward with his remaining infantry. Running the gauntlet, Solomatin saved what he could of his Corps and the accompanying elements of Popov's 6th Rifle Corps.
By the 15th of December Operation Mars had become a disaster. The operation was called off and any hopes of launching Operation Jupiter were abandoned.

Conclusion

Zhukov conducted Operation Mars in characteristic fashion. The Russian assaults were massive and unsparing in manpower and material. He relied on pressure across the entire front and simple manoeuvre to achieve victory.
Skilful German tactical defence by relatively small but tenacious combat groups, which exploited both the terrain and man-made obstacles, managed to bottle up the attacking forces before they reached key objectives in the German operational rear area. Avoiding panic and holding only where necessary, the German command slowly assembled the reserves necessary to counterattack and achieve victory. However despite inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy, the German forces were also severely depleted and exhausted at the end of the battle. Several months later Model asked for and received permission to abandon the Rzhev salient.