Operation Bagration

Situation

Since its withdrawal from Moscow during the Russian winter offensive of 1941-42, German Army Group Center had remained in its positions between the Pripyat marshes and the Dvina River. It formed a large bulge, projecting some 250 miles eastwards and at Orsha and Mogilev, still remained on the eastern bank of the Dnepr River.
For its major offensive operation of the summer, the Russians had assembled four Fronts to reduce the bulge and destroy Army Group Center.
The four Fronts were, from north to south, the 1st Baltic, 3rd Belorussian, 2nd Belorussian and 1st Belorussian Fronts.
The 1st Baltic Front would use its 6th Guards and 43rd Armies to assist in the attack on Vitebsk and would also protect the open northern flank. It would also employ a Cavalry mechanized Group, consisting of the 3rd Guards Mechanized and 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps to exploit that flank.
The 3rd Belorussian Front, in the Orsha-Mogilev sector, would launch an attack with its 11th Guards Army from the north and east, along the main highway and railroad towards Orsha, supported by the 2nd Guards Tank Corps. The 31st Army would mount attacks to the south of 11th Guards Army. In the Vitebsk area, its 5th and 39th Armies would attack to the south of Vitebsk.
The 2nd Belorussian Front would make its attack directly east of Mogilev, using the 49th Army, supported by the 22nd Guards Tank Brigade.
In the south, the 1st Belorussian Front would attack towards Rogachev using the 3rd Army. The 65th Army would also attack Bobruisk, supported by the 1st Guards Tank Corps, with the 28th Army attacking further south. The Front would also employ a Cavalry mechanized Group comprised of the 4th Guards Cavalry and 1st Mechanized Corps to exploit the southern flank. The 5th Guards Tank Army was held in the STAVKA reserve to exploit any major breach made.
The German forces of Army Group Center facing them had been stripped of the majority of their panzer elements, which had been sent south to reinforce Army Group Northern Ukraine, where Hitler and the majority of the High Command were convinced the main thrust of the Russian summer campaign would come.
German forces in the bulge were, from north to south, the 3rd Panzer Army centred on Vitebsk, the 4th Army centred on Mogilev and the 9th Army centred on Bobruisk. Hitler had ordered that German forces maintain a static line of defence, while holding several fortified localities, or 'fester platz', centered on major communications centers. These were Slutsk, Bobruisk, Orsha, Polotsk and Mogilev. Each 'fester platz' was allocated one front line Division for their defence, except Mogilev, which was allocated three.
The terrain in Army Group Center's sector favored the defense and, moreover, presented obstacles to the movement of mass armored formations. Most important of the natural features in the area were the numerous rivers, of which almost all ran north or south. These were the Dnepr, Drut, Berezina, Western Dvina, Svisloch, Ptich, and Neman. All were potential barriers, which unfortunately went unrealized by the defenders. The river system contributed to the second most important of the terrain features in the area, the marshes, bogs and finally, the Pripyat Marshes to the south. These bogs and marshes also restricted cross-country movement and made the roads, rail lines and cities more important than ever.

The Partisan Operation

The opening of the operation was preceded by the largest and most coordinated Partisan activity of any during the whole campaign in the east. On the night of the 19th of June, Belorussian Partisan forces opened the preparation for the Russian offensive by carrying out concerted attacks against rail lines, roads, communication centers and bridges, causing serious disruption to communications and the movement of equipment and reinforcements. They launched large scale attacks across the sector, carrying out 9600 rail demolitions and raids against German held villages and supply depots. They carried out a further 892 rail demolitions the following night, with the Minsk-Orsha and Mogilev-Vitebsk rail lines being hit particularly hard, almost completely paralysing them for several days. As the offensive swept through their concentration areas, the Partisans worked in close cooperation with the regular units. In a number of instances they were identified fighting in the line as units under direct Red Army control.

Vitebsk

STAVKA had planned to open the offensive in stages, in order to conceal its true scope and objectives. The first phase was carried out during the nights of the 19th and 20th of June, by Belorussian Partisan forces.
The second phase of the operation began on the 22nd of June, the date chosen specifically by Stalin as the third anniversary of the German invasion of Russia, to boost the moral and arouse the passions of his troops.
It saw elements of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian Fronts attack the German 3rd Panzer Army in its positions between Polotsk and Orsha. Preceded by a short barrage, which lasted only sixteen minutes, the 6th Guards and 43rd Armies launched attacks northwest of Vitebsk.
During the day, the German 9th Corps, on the left flank of 3rd Panzer Army, was forced back over 5 miles from the area of Sirotino, across a 9 mile wide front. The Germans attempted to restore the situation by moving up the 24th Infantry Division and an assault gun Brigade to reinforce the threatened area of Obel. Further east, in the area of Vitebsk, the 53rd Corps was able to repulse the initial Russian attacks.
To the east and south of Vitebsk, the 39th and 5th Armies of the 3rd Belorussian Front began their assault on the 23rd. By the end of the day the 5th Army had made good progress and the 299th and 197th Infantry Divisions facing the assault had suffered heavy losses. On the 23rd, to the west of Vitebsk, the German 9th Corps was ordered to withdraw to the south and occupy the line of the Dvina River.
By midday on the 24th, the leading elements of the 6th Guards Army had forced crossings of the Dvina River. The German 246th Infantry Division made a vain attempt to hold open an escape corridor for the forces defending Vitebsk by counterattacking the Russian bridgehead on the river. The attack was defeated by elements of the 60th Rifle Corps, assisted by heavy air support from the Red Air Force.
By midday on the 25th, in Vitebsk, the 206th Infantry Division was completely surrounded. Despite several requests for freedom of movement in order to try and breakout of the city, the garrison was ordered to hold the city by Hitler. However, the commander of 53rd Corps, General Gollwitzer, took it upon himself to authorize a breakout and the evacuation of the city. On the morning of the 27th, the remains of the garrison evacuated the city and began their breakout to the south. The group managed to push 12 miles to the southwest of the city where it became encircled once more.
The speed of the Russian advance rapidly widened the distance to the safety of the German lines and a lack of ammunition, fuel and supplies lead to the majority of 53rd Corps remnants, including elements of the 4th and 6th Luftwaffe Field and 246th Infantry Divisions, being killed or captured.
Meanwhile, the rapid Russian advance had reached Lepel and forced a wide gap between 3rd Panzer Army in the north and 4th Army in the south.

To The Berezina

On the 23rd, the left wing of the 3rd Belorussian Front began its move against the German 4th Army. Its 11th Guards Army came up against strong opposition from the 78th Infantry Division and the 25th Panzer Grenadier Division. The 11th Guards Army had more success on its right flank. Its commander, Colonel General Galitsky, switched Divisions over to this flank to exploit his success. On the 24th, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps was pushed into the breach on the right flank. On the evening of the 24th, elements of the German 4th Army, operating to the east of Orsha, withdrew into the Tiger line, between Bogushevsk and Orekhovsk.
On the 25th, it was decided to reposition the 5th Guards Tank Army further north, to advance along the axis of 5th Army where German opposition was less focused. On the evening of the 25th, the northern flank of 4th Army began to withdraw to the Dnepr positions.
On the 26th of June, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps crossed the Vitebsk-Orsha highway and then turned south, also cutting the Orsha-Minsk road. That night, elements of the 11th Guards and 31st Armies, supported by the 25th Guards Tank Brigade, captured Orsha and its important rail junction. That morning, the 5th Guards Tank Army had broken out of its assembly areas and attacked southwest along the Smolensk-Minsk road towards Tolochin.
On the 27th, the 5th Guards Tank Army resumed its advance in the direction of Borisov and the Berezina River.

Mogilev

The morning of the 23rd saw a large artillery bombardment, supported by ground attack aircraft of the Red Air Force, precede attacks by the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts, against 4th Army's positions around Mogilev. By the 26th, a breakthrough by elements of the 49th Army, had reached and crossed the Dnepr north of Mogilev and begun to threaten the northern flank of the 12th Infantry Division to the east of the city. On the 27th, the Russian 238th and 139th Infantry Divisions captured a bridgehead over the Dnepr River at Lupolovo. That night, they broke out of the bridgehead and reinforced by the 330th Infantry Division, captured Mogilev.
On the 28th, the shattered formations of 4th Army began to retreat westwards to a new defensive line behind the Drut River. However command and control was rapidly beginning to break down as the 5th Guards Tank Army broke through the left flank of the Army and into its rear. Further south, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps also forced a breakthrough and headed towards Borisov. Movement westwards was hampered by poor roads, which were crowded with both German forces and refugees. The retreating columns were continually harassed by Partisan attacks and strafing by the Red Air Force, which dominated the skies. At the end of the day, the remnants of the Army were given new orders, to retreat with all haste all the way to the Berezina.
During the 29th, the 12th Corps made slow progress towards a crossing point at Brodets, while the 39th Panzer and 6th Corps, which had begun to merge together, were in the process of withdrawing from their positions on the Drut River further east. These two Corps were to head for a crossing further north at Shukovets. The crossing at Berezino was still open, but coming under heavy pressure from elements of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps.
During the 30th, the bridgehead at Borisov collapsed, reducing the number of crossings available to the withdrawing 4th Army. The following day, Russian forces gradually began to encircle the remnants, forming a pocket in the area of Pekalin, to the east of Minsk. However, a large number of units were still struggling to get back across the Berezina at the few remaining crossing points, with ammunition, food and fuel in short supply.

Bobruysk

The Russian attack against 9th Army's positions in the Bobruysk area did not open until the 24th. Again it was preceded by a large artillery bombardment, supported by ground attack aircraft of the Red Air Force. The Russian 3rd Army made reasonable progress to the northeast of Bobruysk, advancing almost 7 miles along the boundary between 4th and 9th Armies. This penetration was initially slowed by a counter attack from the 20th Panzer Division. Further south, the 48th Army made little progress at all. It was Colonel General I. Batov's 65th Army, which made the most progress, penetrating German positions to a depth of 5 miles across a front of 18 miles. The 20th Panzer Division was ordered to disengage from its counter attack further north and move south to meet this more dangerous threat. It attacked elements of the 1st Guards Tank Corps, which was advancing north westwards towards Bobruysk, trapping a part of German 34th Infantry Division against the Berezina. However, despite the Panzer Divisions best efforts, the overwhelming strength of the 1st Guards Tank Corps forced the attack to be halted on the morning of the 26th. The 20th Panzer Division was ordered to disengage and take up blocking positions along the southwestern approaches to Bobruysk. Further south, the Cavalry mechanized group had reached the Ptich River and was turning towards Slutsk, to the west of Bobruysk.
On the 27th of June, elements of the 1st Guards Tank Corps linked up with the 9th Tank Corps to the west and north of the city. On the 28th, the forces inside the city were given the order to break out of the encirclement and withdraw westwards. The 12th Panzer Division was in the process of arriving in the area and elements took up screening positions along the Svisloch River between Talka and Pogoreloje. On the 28th, elements of the 1st Guards Tank Corps attempted to force a crossing of the river at Lapichi, but were repulsed. On the 1st of July, elements of 12th Panzer Division mounted a relief attempt towards the Svisloch River, in an effort to provide an escape route for the forces withdrawing from Bobruysk. The attempt was partially successful and by the end of the day the remnants of the garrison from Bobruysk, although in a terrible state, had reached the safety of German lines.
Meanwhile, the 1st Guards Tank Corps was thrusting towards Marina Gorka, to the southeast of Minsk. The 12th Panzer Division was ordered to withdraw to the west and set up blocking positions to the southeast of the city. However, the pace of the Russian advance had overtaken events. The 1st Guards Cavalry Corps had reached the River Niemen at Stolbtsy, to the southwest of Minsk, and seized the bridges there. The 12th Panzer Division was forced to move westwards and try to recapture the crossings in conjunction with attacks by the 28th Jager and 4th Panzer Divisions. The Division reached the area on the 3rd of July, but was strung out over some distance. The attacks began on the morning of the 4th and despite some early success, soon ground to a halt. The attack was called off and the 12th Panzer Division was ordered to cross to the western bank of the Berezina, via a pontoon bridge further to the north at Eremichi. By the end of the day on the 6th, the remnants of the Division had managed to cross the Berezina.

Borisov

On the 27th of June, the 5th Panzer Division began arriving in the area of Borisov, northeast of Minsk. Its arrival coincided with new orders for German forces to fall back into defensive positions along the Berezina River. The 5th Panzer Division was ordered to close the gap between 4th Army and 3rd Panzer Army, which had been caused by the rapid penetration of 5th Guards Tank Army, which had advanced through Tolochin and Senno and then thrust towards Borisov.
On the 29th, tanks of the 29th Tank Corps attacked the 5th Panzer Division to the northeast of Borisov. Later that day, the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps threatened to cross the river further north and elements of the 5th Panzer Division were sent to counter that threat in the area of Logoysk. Further to the south of the city, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps had also reached and crossed the Berezina to the south.
The crossings at Borisov had to be held open as long as possible in order to allow the remnants of 4th Army, now retreating with all haste, to move back across the Berezina. With the situation deteriorating, the bridges were finally blown up by German engineers on the evening of the 30th of June. Once the bridges had been destroyed, the remains of the 5th Panzer Division withdrew to the area of Smolovichi, in order to screen Minsk from the northeast. On the 2nd of July, with the 5th Guards Tank Army threatening the important communications center of Molodechno, 5th Panzer was moved northwest to protect the city.

Minsk

On the 2nd of July, fierce fighting developed around Krasnoe and Radoshkovichi, to the northwest of Minsk and Logoysk to the northeast of the city. Elements of the 5th Panzer Division were forced to try and contain these various threats along the northern flank of the city. That night Hitler authorized the evacuation of Minsk and preparations began to abandon the city. To the northeast of the city, the 2nd Guards Tank Army continued its dash towards the city, capturing Smolovichi. It reached Minsk the following day and following sporadic German resistance, liberated the city. Later the same day, units of the 1st Guards Tank Corps reached Minsk from the southeast. The remnants of 4th Army had been pursued by elements of the 3lst, 33rd, 49th and 50th Armies and were trapped in a large pocket in the area of Pekalin, to the east of Minsk, resisting desperately against Russian efforts to reduce it.

4th Army Breaks Out

By the 5th of July, the forces of 4th Army trapped in the pocket to the east of Minsk included the majority of 12th Army Corps, including the 31st, 57th and 267th Infantry Divisions, with remnants of the 25th Panzer Grenadier, 78th and 260th Infantry Divisions and elements of 27th Corps attached. A decision was made by the Corps commanders to break out in two Corps groups. The elements of 27th Corps were to break out to the west, while 12th Corps would attempt to break out to the northwest.
The breakout began at midnight, with the 25th Panzergrenadier Division striking west towards Dzerzhinsk. The Division was gradually separated into smaller groups, some of which managed to cross the Bobruisk-Minsk railway line and then turned east, bypassing Minsk to the north. The groups eventually reached the safety of the German lines at Molodechno. The 57th Infantry Division made slow progress, managing to join up with the remnants of the Feldherrnhalle Division on the morning of the 6th. The two Divisions attempted to cross the Cherven-Minsk road that night, but the Feldherrnhalle was scattered and most of its men captured. The 57th Division broke into ever-smaller groups and again most were killed or captured. The 78th and 267th Divisions fared no better. Despite achieving initial breakouts, during the 6th, the majority of the men were either killed or captured.
It is estimated that the forces trapped in the pocket numbered some 105,000 men. It took Russian forces until the 11th of July to reduce it, with approximately 40,000 Germans killed and 57,000 captured.

Exploiting the Flanks

On the northern flank, by the 3rd of July, the northern Cavalry Mechanized Group had reached Molodechno and Smorgon.
By the 7th of July, elements of the 65th Army and the southern Cavalry mechanized Group had reached the important communications center of Baronovichi. The town was assaulted from the south and east and was liberated the following day, with the garrison withdrawing towards Slonim.
With Minsk liberated and 4th Army trapped, Russian forces paused to reorganize and prepare to exploit the operation to the borders of Belorussia. The 1st Baltic Front was given the task of clearing German forces in northern Belorussia and then conducting the Kaunaa Operation, advancing into Lithuania from the 28th of July to the 28th of August. The 3rd Belorussian Front was ordered to continue its advance towards Vilnius in Lithuania. The 2nd Belorussian Front took part in the Bialystok / Brest operation, which pushed back the remnants of Army Group Center to the Polish border. The left wing of the 1st Belorussian Front, captured Lublin and Brest and then advanced to the eastern bank of the Vistula at Warsaw between the 17th and 31st of July.

Conclusion

The Russians employed considerable maskirovka in the lead up to the operation in order to keep troop strengths, deployments and intentions secret. Planning of the operation was carried out in a tight circle within STAVKA and the Front commanders were only given their orders on the 31st of May. Detailed orders to individual units for the attack were only given days before the operation began. Troops in the concentration areas constructed defensive positions to mask their intentions. Movement into the concentration areas was carried out only just prior to the beginning of the operation and was carried out only at night under the strictest security. The Germans inability to detect the build up of forces and their intentions, and their belief that the focus of the Russian summer campaign would fall further south, led them to seriously denude Army Group Center of the majority of its Panzer Divisions. This, added to the large superiority the Russians held in infantry, artillery, armor and air power left the German forces little chance of any success.
Hitler insisted on constructing a rigid defence along a static front, centered on fortified localities, or 'fester platz'. This tied down the defence and played into Russian hands, as they simply bypassed the fortified localities, trapping the defending units within and then destroying them at will. The Russian mobile forces advanced so rapidly, that it made it almost impossible for units breaking out of encirclement to reach the safety of their own lines, which were pushed rapidly westwards.
Russian air power also played a decisive part in the operation. Following the Allied invasion on the Normandy coast, the vast majority of Luftwaffe fighter squadrons had been transferred to the west to counter the Allied air forces, which were pinning down German forces attempting to counter the landings. With total air supremacy over the battlefield, the Red Air Force helped to smash the German defences and then continually harass the German forces as they withdrew.
The operation was an unqualified success, not only liberating the last areas of Russian territory held by the Germans, but bringing about the total collapse of Army Group Center. Of thirty four Divisions fielded in the area, almost twenty eight were destroyed or enabled innefective at the operations conclusion. Almost 300,000 Germans were killed or captured and a gaping hole had been torn in the German front, leaving the road to Berlin open.

For a full and in depth account of Operation Bagration, read Hitler's Greatest Defeat: The Collapse of Army Group Centre by Paul Adair. See the sources page for details.