The Battle of Kursk

Situation

Following the destruction of 6th Army at Stalingrad and the German counter offensive on the southern wing of the Eastern Front in early 1943, both sides were in dire need of an operational pause. This arrived in the form of the spring thaw and the poor ground conditions it created.
During this time both sides looked for an opportunity to regain the initiative. The Germans saw an opportunity with the Kursk salient. The salient, between Orel and Belgorod, jutted westwards for some eighty miles. The Germans planned to cut the base of the salient with a pincer movement. From the north, a heavily reinforced 9th Army would attack from Orel through Ponyri towards Kursk. In the south the 4th Panzer Army would attack from the southwest of Belgorod through Oboyan and link up with the northern pincer at Kursk.

Zhukov's Plan

Marshal Zhukov was convinced that the German offensive effort that summer would fall against the Kursk salient. He proposed to Stalin and the STAVKA that Russian forces there prepare a deeply echeloned defense, supported by a large reserve, with which to meet and then wear down the German attack. Only once this had been achieved did he propose that Russian forces go over to the offensive across all major fronts. Stalin was worried about the possibility of German forces mounting a renewed offensive against Moscow and only after Zhukov's considerable efforts to convince him of German intentions against the Kursk salient, did he consent to Zhukov's plan.

Russian Preparations

The Central Front, commanded by Konstantine Rokossovsky, occupied the northern shoulder of the salient. Rokassovsky concentrated the main strength of his force along a 50 mile front occupying the northern curve of the salient between Trosna and Maloarkhangelsk. The force was deployed in two echelons, the first of which consisted of three armies, the 13th, 48th and 70th. These were again deployed in two echelons, a formation consistently applied by all formations in the salient. In addition to these front line forces, Rokassovsky placed the 2nd Tank Army at Fetezh as a reserve echelon. Further south occupying the face of the salient, along a front of 100 miles, were the 60th and 65th Armies. The reserve in this sector was provided by the 18th Guards Rifle Corps and the 9th and 19th Tank Corps.
On the Voronezh Front, commanded by Nikolai Vatutin, the main strength was concentrated to cover the Kharkov, Oboyan, Kursk highway. Here, the 6th Guards Army occupied a front of 30 miles, with 7th Guards Army to its south occupying a front of 25 miles. The reserve in this area was provided by the 1st Tank Army at Oboyan and the 69th Army at Olkhovka covering the Belgorod, Korocha, Volchansk, Novy Oskol axis. The southern face of the salient was occupied by the 38th and 40th Armies, with the 35th Guards Rifle Corps and the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps in reserve.
Behind the salient, STAVKA had assembled a large strategic reserve along a line running from Livny to Stary Oskol. This reserve was formed by the Steppe Front, which consisted of the 4th and 5th Guards and 27th, 53rd and 57th Armies and the 5th Guards Tank Army. Within the salient, in addition to the forces assembled, considerable field defenses were constructed. The initial defense sectors were strengthened by five, interconnected trench lines, interlinked with strong points and anti tank positions. The anti tank positions were organized in a series of strong points, placed in a checker board style, at half mile intervals and up to five miles in depth. They were guarded by ditches and minefields and designed to channel the attackers into their fields of fire. Over 500 miles of barbed wire entanglement and anti tank obstacles were prepared and over 1 million anti personnel and anti tank mines were laid. These defense lines were stretched up to 50 miles in depth. In addition, a considerable deception plan was used to confuse German intelligence. Great efforts were made in the creation of false troop concentrations, simulated radio nets, and the construction of dummy armored and aircraft concentrations and the construction of dummy airfields. Strict radio silence was maintained and all troop movements were conducted at night, under strict blackout conditions. In the German rear areas Partisan activity wrought havoc. In June over 1000 attacks against railways took place including the destruction of 44 bridges and almost 300 locomotives.

German Preparations

German forces had also spent the time provided by the spring thaw in preparation. The northern pincer was formed by Models 9th Army. It consisted of the 41st, 46th and 47th Panzer and 23rd Infantry Corps which were assembled between Trosna and Krasnaya Slobodka. To the west of Trosna was 20th Corps and the Army reserve, Group Von Esbeck. Model's left flank, to the east and north of Orel was protected by the 2nd Panzer Army.
The southern pincer was formed by Hoth's 4th Panzer Army and further south Army Detachment Kempf. The 4th Panzer Army consisted of the 48th, 2nd SS Panzer and 52nd Infantry Corps, while detachment Kempf comprised of the 3rd Panzer and 11th and 42nd Infantry Corps. The army group reserve was provided by the 24th Panzer Corps. The face of the salient was covered by 2nd Army, commanded by Walter Weiss.
The German High Command was taking a huge gamble with the operation. Almost 70% of all armored strength on the Eastern Front was gathered into the force prepared for Citadel. All units had been rested and brought up to strength and had engaged in several weeks of offensive training during the build up to the offensive. The High Command had invested heavily on new weaponry to swing the balance of the offensive. The Panther tank and Elephant tank destroyer were to receive their baptism of fire during the operation.

Citadel Begins

Preparations for the offensive began on the night of the 3rd of July, when German engineers began clearing paths through the minefields in 9th Army's sector. In 4th Panzer Army's sector, a series of low hills screening the initial Russian defense line and providing positions for Russian artillery observers to overlook the German assembly areas, had to be captured before the main assault could begin. At 03:00 on the morning of the 4th of July, the Luftwaffe began its bombardment of the Russian positions and this was followed at 03:30 by an artillery bombardment. The 48th Panzer Corps rolled forward behind the bombardment towards the high ground to the south of Butovo. The Russian 199th Guards Rifle Regiment was overrun and forced out of its positions by the 3rd Battalion of the Grossdeutschland Regiment, while Russian positions to the east of Butovo were captured by forward units of the 11th Panzer Division. Further east, the SS Panzer Corps also made good progress, capturing the high ground at Yakhontovo and Streletskoye which had been held by the 52nd Guards Rifle Division. However, to the west of Butovo the 394th Regiment of the 3rd Panzer Division met stiff resistance in the area of Gertsovka. Here the Russian 71st Guards Rifle Regiment managed to slow the German advance and inflict heavy casualties. It was not until midnight on the 4th, that the Division secured its objectives on the high ground and even then it faced repeated counter attacks through the night. At 22:30 on the 4th and 02:30 on the 5th, the artillery of the 6th Guards Army launched fierce counter bombardments against the heights and also against German artillery positions in the area.
In 9th Army's sector on the northern wing, the main assault began at 05:00 on the morning of the 5th, following the Luftwaffe's ariel bombardment of the Russian 13th Army's positions. German engineers worked frantically to clear paths through the minefields and it wasn't until 08:30 that the main force began to move through them.
On the northern wing, 9th Army used the 6th, 7th, 31st, 78th, 86th and 292nd Infantry Division and the 20th Panzer Division, to attack along a 15 mile front held by the Russian 15th and 81st Rifle Divisions. By 09:30 the 20th Panzer Division had fought its way to Bobrik, capturing the village and dislodging the 321st Rifle Regiment. The 6th Infantry Division had crossed the Oka River, captured the village of Novy Chutor and with the support of Panzer Battalion 505, reached the village of Yasnaya Polyana. The Division attacked the village and dislodged the 676th Rifle Regiment. By midday, the junction of the two Russian Divisions was in danger of being prized open, threatening the right wing of 70th Army. The commander of the Central Front, Constantine Rokassovsky, implemented a rapid redeployment of his forces to meet the threat. The 2nd Tank Army's 3rd Tank Corps was moved to the south of Ponyri, while the 16th Tank Corps was moved to the northwest of the town and the 19th Tank Corps to the west of Olkhovatka. Despite the 292nd Infantry Division advancing as far as Butyrki and linking up with the 6th Panzer Division, the German advance on the northern wing was beginning to stall. The 78th Infantry Division was ordered to capture hill 253.5 to the east of Ponyri. However the Division soon became bogged down in a maze of trench lines and their support guns became separated from their infantry support. By the following day, the 20th Panzer Division had battered its way as far as Gnilets, only four miles from its start line. Moreover, the Division was losing vehicles in the Russian minefields and to the anti tank strong points at a rate it could not sustain. By the morning of the 6th of July, the 86th Infantry Division had forced its way into the third line of Russian defences and its 184th Grenadier Regiment had reached the northern outskirts of Ponyri. At the same time the 292nd Division was approaching Aleksandrovka.
In the southern sector, the commander of 4th Panzer Army, Hermann Hoth, had decided on his own initiative, following ariel recconnaisance reports, to drive north towards Prokhorovka, in an attempt to avoid the Russian 1st Tank Army. This caught the Russian's off guard, as they had expected hoth to move directly towards Kursk via Oboyan. The attack was again proceeded by a huge artillery barrage and heavily supported by Luftwaffe ground attack aircraft. The attack quickly began to stall in poor ground conditions and the Russian minefields. Despite its initial difficulties the Grossdeutschland Division were approaching Cherkasskoye and by that evening the town was in German hands. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps assaulted the village of Beresov and then continued to make good progress. By the end of the day it had advanced almost 12 miles into the defence zone of 6th Guards Army, reaching the Belgorod-Oboyan highway.

The Northern Pincer is Halted

Despite this progress in the south, on the northern wing the initial gains achieved by the 216th and 383rd Divisions in the Maloarkhangelsk area had been reversed by determined Russian counter attacks from the Russian 254th and 184th Rifle Divisions. Worse still this failure to secure 9th Army's left wing would expose it to attack from the Russian strategic reserve which was moving towards the salient.
On the morning of the 6th of July Rokassovsky initiated a counter attack along the Olkhovatka axis using the 3rd, 16th and 19th Tank Corps. Soon after the attack began, it bogged down on the Russian minefields which had been strengthened by German engineers. It was now that Model took his chance and committed the 2nd, 9th and 18th Panzer Divisions to take the dominating heights of hills 272 south west of Teploye, hill 274 northeast of Olkhovatka and hill 253.5 east of Ponyri. These heights running in a curve for almost 15 miles, lay at the heart of the Russian defences and their capture was a key factor to success in the northern half of the salient. However the center of the Russian line was packed with 3000 guns and 1000 tanks and Rokossovsky had also been feeding in reinforcements from quieter sectors.
The German attack began on the morning of the 6th, with the 2nd Panzer Division capturing Soborovka. The 20th Panzer Division had cleared the route towards Teploye having fought a fierce battle for the village of Samodurovka. This left the way clear for the 4th Panzer Division to advance towards hill 272 supported heavily by ground attack aircraft of the Luftwaffe. Rokossovsky had grasped the importance of this sector and had heavily reinforced it. The town was captured late that afternoon and the Division pushed on to clear the hill. Three times they captured it and three times they were thrown back off it by heavy Russian counter attacks.
At Olkhovatka the 6th Division fought its way to the lower slopes of hill 274 where it was halted. At Ponyri the 292nd Division had captured the railway embankment and elements of the 9th and 18th Panzer Divisions had clawed a foothold in the town defended by the 1032nd Rifle Regiment, but became bogged down in heavy fighting at the tractor factory, the school and the railway station.
On the 8th, Model introduced the 4th Panzer Division, in an effort to capture the village of Teploye. However, Rokassovsky had heavily reinforced the area and the assault was repulsed after two days of heavy fighting.
On the night of the 10th, Model withdrew the 292nd Division and replaced it with the 10th Panzer Grenadier Division, which managed to repel a series of Russian counter attacks on the 11th and 12th. German forces in the north failed to capture the hills and with its offensive strength spent these positions marked the furthest extent of their advance.

Tank Battle at Prokhorovka

In the south however, German forces had fared better against the Voronezh Front. Despite 48th Corps inability to cross the swollen stream between Alekseyevka and Sertsev on the 6th, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps had fared better. While the Leibstandarte Division had captured the important Hill 243 and cleared the road to Luchki, the Totenkopf Division had managed to outflank the Russian forces and advance 20 miles to the north, cutting the Belgorod-Oboyan highway and reaching the Belgorod-Kursk railway on the evening of the 6th. The Russians rushed forward the 27th Army to try and plug the gap.
On the 7th of July, the 5th Guards Tank Army began its move towards Prokhorovka, while the German 48th Corps finally managed to cross the stream and the Grossdeutschland Division broke through on either side of the village of Sertsev, pushing the remnants of 6th Guards Army towards Sertsevo and Gremutschy. The Grossdeutschland and elements of the 11th Panzer Division wheeled northwest towards Sertsevo, the last major defensive position before Oboyan, where they were halted by counter attacks from the 3rd Mechanized and 6th Tank Corps. However, further west, the 3rd Panzer Division had made slow progress towards Berezovka, leaving the Grossdeutschland's left flank dangerously exposed. To make matters worse the Russians had moved the 67th Guards Rifle Division forward to reinforce the line at Sertsevo.
The 2nd SS Panzer Corps had also made progress, with the Leibstandarte reaching Psolknee, where it was counter attacked fiercely by the 3rd Mechanized Corps. However, on 2nd SS Panzer Corps right flank, Army Detachment Kempf had failed to make significant progress east of the Donets and a combat group from the 2nd Tank Corps exploited the situation to attack the 2nd SS Panzer Corps open flank. The Russian attack began on the morning of the 8th, moving west in an attempt to cut the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. However the attack was spotted by German ground attack aircraft who broke up the attack and destroyed most of the Russian armour.
The same morning the Grossdeutschland Division advanced along the Oboyan road, bypassing Hill 260.8 and the strongly held village of Verkhopenye. Other elements of the Division assaulted Hill 243 which it captured that evening after a day of heavy fighting. Despite this success, Russian forces continued to carry out a series of counter attacks throughout the night.
On the 9th, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps continued to grind its way forward through the final Russian defense line in its sector. The Totenkopf Division crossed the Psel River and then captured the villages of Vasilyevka, Koslovka and Krasny Oktober which it held despite repeated heavy counter attacks by elements of the 69th Army. To the west the 48th Panzer Corps had mostly been held by fierce Russian resistance, but the 3rd Panzer Division had made progress, crossing the Pena River and establishing a small bridgehead by the end of the day.
On the 10th, the Grossdeutschland Division crossed the Pena and then wheeled south west to clear enemy forces in Berezovka. Heavily supported by ground attack aircraft it cleared hills 243 and 247 and then the town itself. Meanwhile the 5th Guards Tank Army had arrived south west of Stary Oskol, where it joined 5th Guards Army. To the west of Stary Oskol, the 2nd Tank and 2nd Guards Tank Corps had also deployed to face the threat approaching from the south towards Prokhorovka.
On the 11th, Army Group South pressed on with its advance towards Prokhorovka, with the 2nd SS Panzer Corps leading the way. To its east, Army Detachment Kempf also drove northwards into the positions of the 69th Army around Rzhavets, which was captured that night by elements of the 6th Panzer Division. Meanwhile the 2nd SS Panzer Corps advance had been halted south of Prokhorovka.
On the 12th, the 6th Panzer Division had managed to gain a small bridgehead over the Donets River to the north of Rzhavets, while further east the remainder of the Division was still involved in heavy fighting around the village of Alexsandrovka, which it did not capture until the following day. The main action however would be the battle at Prokhorovka, where the 2nd SS Panzer Corps and the 5th Guards Tank Army would clash in a battle of unforgiving ferocity which would decide the fate of the whole operation. At 06:30 the days action was preceded with an airial bombardment by the Luftwaffe. This was countered by a Russian artillery barrage aimed against the German assembly areas. As the armor of the two sides clashed, the battlefield became a confused melee, with both sides fighting at close range. Neither sides artillery or ground attack aircraft were able to intervene in the battle due to the close proximity of the opposing vehicles on the battlefield. On the north bank of the Psel river the Totenkopf Division was locked in a fierce battle against elements of the 31st Tank and the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps, while the Das Reich Division was attacked by the 2nd Guards Tank Corps. In the center of the Russian line. the 18th and 29th Tank Corps had halted the advance of the Leibstandarte Division. By the afternoon, the 2nd Guards and 2nd Tank Corps had broken into the area west of Belenichino and east of Kalinin. At the junction of the 5th Guards and the 5th Guards Tank Armies, the 18th Tank Corps was in danger of collapse as German tanks broke through its lines to the northwest of Prokhorovka. The Russians committed their remaining reserve in the area, the 10th Guards Mechanized and 24th Guards Tank Brigades to secure the breach. They managed to stabilize the situation and that night both sides went into defensive positions as they prepared for the next day.

The Operation is Abandoned

However, events elsewhere were to effect the future of operation Citadel. Allied forces had carried out an air and seaborne landing in Sicily on the 10th, threatening southern Europe. On the 12th of July, Russian forces launched a large counter offensive to the north of the salient, in an attempt to break into the rear of 9th Army. It broke against the weakened 2nd Panzer Army and was executed by the Western Fronts 11th Guards Army, the Bryansk Fronts 3rd, 61st and 63rd Armies and the Central Fronts 13th and 70th Armies. The attack was preceded by aggressive recconnaisance on the 11th and heavy air attacks and artillery bombardment on the morning of the 12th. By the evening of the 14th, the 11th Guards Army had advanced 10 miles and the 11th Army and Fourth Tank Army followed in its wake to support the breakthrough. Meanwhile in the south of the salient on the 13th, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps was unable to make any further progress and poor ground conditions were hampering its re-supply efforts. Russian forces drove back the 3rd Panzer Division in the area of the Rakovo-Kruglik road and recaptured hill 247 and the town of Berezovka. On the 14th, the Totenkopf Division was forced out of its bridgehead on the northern bank of the Psel River, while further east the Das Reich Division had made limited progress, capturing the town of Belenichino. The Grossdeutschland Division was ordered to attack westwards, in order to recapture the ground lost by the 3rd Panzer Division. After a day of heavy fighting the Division finally managed to link up with 3rd Panzer at Berezovka, but it was unable to dislodge Russian forces from Hill 247.
On the 15th, the Das Reich Division made contact with the 7th Panzer Division, part of Kempf's 3rd Panzer Corps, which had made slow progress from the south. However the Russian offensive to the north of the salient was now threatening 9th Army's rear and it was forced to begin a planned withdrawal westwards to avoid encirclement. After the 15th, almost all offensive action around Prokhorovka ceased and German forces in the area went over to the defensive.
On the 17th, a further series of Russian offensives opened along the entire eastern front. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps and the Gross Deutschland Division were withdrawn from 4th Panzer Army and the operation was cancelled. By the 23rd of July, 4th Panzer Army had withdrawn to its starts lines and to the north it was the 18th of August by the time 9th Army had extricated itself to the safety of the Hagen Line.

Conclusion

Operation Citadel was a catastrophe for German forces on the eastern front. The German high command chose an objective for the operation that was far to obvious and overly ambitious. It also continually delayed the start date of the operation, allowing Russian forces additional time to prepare their defensive positions in the salient. The Russian's were well informed of German intentions, both by the Lucy spy network in Switzerland and by the British government who had decoded German Ultra signals. The Russian's had made concentrated preparations in the salient. The deeply echeloned defence lines, vast minefields, field defences, interspersed with anti tank strong points, was designed to allow the German attack to gradually wear itself out. Despite German efforts to batter their way through, they had neither the strength or resources to do so. The cream of the German panzer force, so carefully husbanded prior to the operation, was exhausted and the Russian's had undeniably and completely gained the initiative on the eastern front. The campaign in the east would now consist of a series of German retreats and Russian successes.

For a full and in depth account of the battle for Kursk read The Battle of Kursk: Operation Citadel 1943 by Robin Cross or The Battle of Kursk by David Glantz. See the sources page for details.