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The 2nd Battle of Kharkov
Situation
The Kharkov area was a pivotal area on the
Eastern Front, sitting astride two important strategic axes towards Kursk
and the Donbas. The Russian STAVKA had decided that to regain the strategic
initiative during the spring of 1942, offensive action should be taken
before German forces had time to refit and initiate their own summer offensive.
They chose the Kharkov area because of its strategic importance and because
they felt that German forces in the area were particularly weak following
their actions to combat the Russian winter offensive. However, the German
6th and 1st Panzer Armies were assembling in the Kharkov area in preparation
for an offensive against the Barvenkovo salient, operation 'Friderikus'.
The area is traversed by the Northern Donets River, along whose banks
ran the forward edge of both side's defences. Russian forces had established
two significant bridgeheads on the river, one to the south of Kharkov
at Barvenkovo and one to the east at Staryi Soltov. German forces meanwhile
also occupied bridgeheads, one to the southeast of Kharkov at Chuguev
and one to the east of Belgorod at Miasoedovo.
Preparations and Opposing Forces
The Russians employed the forces of two Fronts for the
operation. The northern shock group was formed by forces of the Southwestern
Front, consisting of the 6th, 21st, 28th and 38th Armies. Forces of the
Southern Front consisting of the 6th, 9th and 57th Armies formed the southern
shock group, which occupied the Barvenkovo salient.
Opposing them were the German 6th and 17th Armies, which consisted of
the 29th and 17th Army Corps in the north, 51st Army Corps in the center
and the 8th in the south. Also in the Kharkov area
were elements of the 1st Panzer Army, which consisted of the 3rd Panzer
Corps, 11th, 6th and 44th Army Corps.
The Offensive Begins
The
offensive was opened in the northern sector at 06:30 on the 12th of May,
with an hour-long artillery barrage. This was followed by a 20-minute
aerial bombardment by the aircraft of the 52nd and 135th Bomber Regiments.
Elements of the 21st, 28th and 38th Armies joined the assault at 07:30,
but despite initial gains of up to 3km, the attack did not progress as
well as planned.
The 28th Army's 13th Guards Division and 90th Tank Brigade broke through
the positions of the 294th Infantry Division to the south of Veseloe.
They captured the towns of Bairak, Kupevakha, Dragunovka and by the end
of the day had reached Peremoga.
The 21st Army's 76th Rifle Division managed to establish a small bridgehead
on the Northern Donets River at Bezliudovka. During the day the 293rd
and 227th Infantry Divisions moved through the bridgehead and managed
to advance up to 10km, capturing Ogurtsovo, Bugrovatka and Staritsa.
The greatest success came in 38th Army's area. Its 226th Rifle Division,
supported by the 36th Tank Brigade, broke through the positions of the
71st Infantry Division to the south of Permoga and advanced over 10km,
capturing Nepokrytaia and then later in the day Mikhailovka Pervaia. On
the Army's left flank the 124th Rifle Division, supported by the 13th
Tank Brigade, crossed the Bolshaia Babka River and captured Peschanoe
after a day of heavy fighting. Further south the 81st Rifle Division captured
the village of Bolshaia Babka.
However, even at this early stage of the battle, Russian intelligence
gathering had begun to expose the fact that the German force they were
facing might be more significant than at first thought. At the end of
the first day, 38th Army was ordered to withdraw its three tank Brigades
from the battle and move them over to protect the Army's left flank from
a possible counter attack by German armored forces assembling in the Kharkov
area.
Those same German armored forces, the 3rd and 23rd Panzer Divisions, were
meanwhile moving into the Chervona Roganka, Privole and Zarozhnoe areas,
along with three fresh infantry Regiments from the 71st and 44th Infantry
Divisions. The Germans also hastily recalled the aircraft of the 4th Air
Fleet from the Crimea. The support given by the Luftwaffe would play a
crucial part during the remainder of the battle.
At dawn on the 13th, the Russians resumed the offensive. In 21st Army's
area, elements of the 76th and 293rd Rifle Divisions linked together to
form a bridgehead over the Northern Donets River at Murom. However, despite
heavy fighting the Russians were unable to expand the bridgehead. Further
south, the 227th Infantry Division fared better, managing to advance 12km.
That afternoon German forces began to mount strong counter attacks, supported
by armour and aircraft, towards Staryi Saltov.
In 28th Army's area, the 244th Infantry Division and 13th Guards Rifle
Division, supported by the 57th and 90th Tank Brigades, surrounded and
bypassed German forces defending Ternovaia and advanced 6km towards Petrovskoe,
also capturing the town of Krasnyi. Further north the 169th and 175th
Infantry Divisions captured Peremoga.
Just after midday the Germans opened a counter attack, with 3rd Panzer
Division advancing from the area of Privol and the 23rd Panzer Division
from the area of Zarozhnoe. The counter attack broke against the 124th
and 81st Infantry Divisions, forcing them back and exposing the left flank
of the 266th Rifle Division. The three Divisions withdrew as best they
could to defensive positions along the Bolshaia Babka River, as the three
tank Brigades withdrawn the previous day, moved forward to help them halt
the German advance. This setback put an end to any further offensive role
that 38th Army would have in the Kharkov operation.
The
14th of May saw 28th Army left with responsibility for continuing the
offensive towards Kharkov. The Germans meanwhile attempted to exploit
the previous days success by concentrating their advance along the boundary
of the 28th and 38th Armies, recapturing Nepokrytaia. They also began
to move the 168th infantry Division south from Belgorod to reinforce the
area around Cheremoshnoe.
On the left flank of 28th Army, the 13th Guards Rifle Division went over
the defensive and was reinforced by the 57th Tank Brigade in order to
contain the German counter attack. The remainder of the Army continued
with its offensive action. Further north the 169th and 175th Infantry
Divisions, supported by the 84th Tank Brigade, advanced a further 6-8km,
capturing the towns of Bezbozhnyi, Neskuchnoe, Veseloe, Petrovskoe and
reaching the Murom River. At Ternovaia, Kampfgruppe Gruner, consisting
of elements of Infantry Regiment 429 of the 168th Infantry Division, continued
to hold out against repeated attacks from the 38th Rifle Division, which
surrounded it. The 244th Infantry Division had also
managed to advance, despite heavy air attacks by the Luftwaffe, capturing
the town of Petrovskoe.
On the northern sector on the 15th of May, the 28th Army, supported by
elements of the 21st Army, attempted to exploit the offensive and capture
Kharkov from the north and northwest. However, the Germans had reinforced
the line with units from the 168th Division and the Russian attempts to
break through towards Kharkov met with little success. Worse still, elements
of the 3rd and 23rd Panzer Divisions, supported by the 71st Infantry Division,
initiated several counter attacks in the directions of Borshchevoe, Cherkasskie
Tishki and Nepokrytaia, while further north the 168th Infantry Division
counter attacked towards Murom. These attacks were supported by concentrated
air attacks, with aircraft of the 4th Air Fleet, which flew 532 combat
sorties on the 15th of May alone. Elements of the 3rd Panzer Division
managed to make considerable gains of up to 10km during the day, forcing
the 244th Rifle Division to withdraw into an area southwest of Ternovaia.
The 175th and 169th Rifle Divisions did make some progress, advancing
5km, reaching the Lipets River to the northeast of Liptsy and the outskirts
of the town itself by the end of the day. However the gain was short lived
and the Division was forced to withdraw due to the deteriorating situation
of the 244th Division on its flank. During the day the 38th Rifle Division
continued its attempts to reduce the German garrison in Ternovaia. Despite
bitter fighting, the German forces in the town continued to hold out.
On the 16th of May, the northern shock group went over to the defensive.
The Kampfgruppe from 3rd Panzer, blocked from its attempt to reach the
encircled garrison in Ternovaia from the southwest, turned northwest along
the Murom River valley toward Neskuchnoe, where the 169th Rifle Division
halted it.
The Southern Shock Group
The
offensive to the southwest of Kharkov, emanating from the Barvenkovo salient,
also opened on the 12th of May with a 60 minute artillery barrage and
15 minute aerial bombardment. On 6th Army's right flank, its 47th and
253rd Rifle Divisions fought throughout the day against elements of the
German 62nd Infantry Division to make a small gain of 2km, capturing the
town of Verkhnii Bishkin. The 41st Rifle Division, supported by the 48th
Tank Brigade, made contact with the 62nd Infantry Division and reached
Verkhniaia Bereka.
Further west, the 411th and 266th Rifle Divisions made good progress.
They broke the resistance of the 454th Security Division and by the end
of the day had reached the Orel River, establishing bridgeheads at Shevchenko,
Ulianovka and Nizhnii Orel. These bridgeheads were expanded with the introduction
of the 6th Cavalry Corps and the 7th Tank Brigade. The Germans were forced
to introduce elements of the 113th Infantry and Hungarian 108th Light
Infantry Divisions to stabilize the line.
On the 13th of May, the 6th Cavalry Corps continued to make progress in
the direction of Shliakhovaia and the following day captured the towns
of Kazachii Maidan, Rosokhovatoe and Novolvovka. To the south the 393rd
and 270th Rifle Divisions forced back elements of the 454th Security Division
and captured Kokhanovka, Voroshilovka and Ulianovka.
On the 15th of May, Army Group Bobkin in conjunction with elements of
the 6th Army, continued their attempt to exploit the offensive towards
Krasnograd. Despite concentrated German air attacks, 6th Army's 411th
and 266th Rifle Divisions reached the Berestovaia River and captured Okhochae.
Further east the 47th Rifle Division reached the Northern Donets River
at Glinishche, while the 253rd Rifle Division reached the Sukhaia Gomelsha
River at Bolshaia Gomelsha. To the west the 6th Guards Cavalry Corps had
reached the outskirts of Krasnograd and begun to encircle the city. To
the southeast of the city the 270th and 393rd Rifle Divisions were pursuing
the 454th Security Division in its withdrawal and cut the Krasnograd-Lozovaia
railway line, capturing Kegichevka, Dar Nadezhdy and Kasenivka. With the
breach widening and the flanks secured, this left the Russian forces in
a position to commit their mobile forces into the breach and exploit the
offensive. However, the mobile forces of 21st and 23rd Tank Corps were
still some 25km behind the front. It took until the 17th for the two Corps
to assemble and move up to positions nearer the front.
This valuable pause enabled the German forces in the area to consolidate
their positions and reinforce the line. The 113th Infantry Division reinforced
the 454th Security Divisions left flank at Kegichevka and the 62nd Infantry
Division along the western bank of the Berestovaia River. In addition,
elements of the 305th Infantry Division reinforced the garrison at Krasnograd
and the 62nd Infantry Division at Taranovka. The Germans were also assembling
mobile forces to strike against the flanks of the Barvenkovo salient.
Elements of the 1st Panzer Army would attack northwards towards Izyum.
The thrust was to be made from the area between Andreevka and Maiaki and
would employ the 3rd Panzer, 44th and 52nd Army Corps.
The German Counter Offensive
The
German counter offensive against the Barvenkovo salient began on the morning
of the 17th of May and was preceded by a 90-minute artillery bombardment.
Elements of the 14th Panzer Division attacked towards Barvenkovo, along
the boundary of the 106th and 341st Rifle Divisions. The 384th Infantry
and 16th Panzer Divisions attacked towards Dolgenkaia against the 51st
and 335th Rifle Divisions. The assaults were supported by strong air attacks
and broke through the Russian defences on both axes. The Russian forces
also suffered from severe communications disruption and command and control
rapidly broke down. By the end of the day, elements of the 14th Panzer
Division had captured Barvenkovo and opened a 20km wide breach in the
Russian defences between Novo Prigozhaia and Barvekovo. The 257th Infantry
Division had reached the Northern Donets River and captured the town of
Bogorodichnoye.
Despite this setback, Russian forces continued with efforts to develop
their offensive westwards. The 21st Tank Corps had begun to advance towards
Taranovka, capturing the town by the end of the day, while further west
the 23rd Tank Corps had crossed the Berestovaia River, advancing 15km
towards Novaia Vodolaga and cutting the Kharkov-Krasnograd rail line.
On the 17th of May, 23rd Panzer Divisions Kampfgruppe
Soltmann finally managed to break through to the encircled German garrison
at Ternovaia. Further north, elements of the 168th Infantry Division were
continuing with offensive action in the direction of Murom, which was
only halted by strong resistance from the 5th Guards Cavalry Division
in the area of Hill 207. At this point the whole of the northern shock
group had gone over to the defensive. Despite this, on the 18th, the 38th
Rifle Division managed to close the encirclement around the garrison at
Ternovaia.
On the 20th, the northern shock group's 293rd Rifle Division came under
increasing pressure from the 168th Infantry Division to the west of Murom.
This left the flank of the 28th Army exposed and forced its commander
to use the 34th Motor Rifle Brigade and the 32nd Cavalry Division to try
and secure the flank. The Germans had also pushed the 88th Infantry Division
into the gap that had formed to the northwest of Murom. The 3rd and 23rd
Panzer Divisions also exerted pressure on the small pocket that had formed
between Murom, Liptsy and Ternovaia. This pressure forced the Russian
units occupying the pocket to begin to withdraw eastwards with heavy losses
and effectively concluded any further offensive action by elements of
the northern shock group. This allowed the Germans to withdraw the 3rd
and 23rd Panzer Divisions and move them by rail to Chuguev to take part
in the operations against the northern edge of the Barvenkovo salient.
In the southern sector on the 18th, the 101st Light
Infantry Division also reached the Northern Donets River and with the
flanks secured the 16th Panzer Division drove to the west of Izyum. Further
west the 14th Panzer Division crossed the Sukhoy Torets River and captured
Barvenkovo. The German advance cut off elements of the 5th Cavalry Corps
to the southwest of Barvenkovo and forced a wedge between the 9th and
57th Armies. Worse still, the rapid German advance compelled the Red Air
Force to evacuate its forward airfields at Izyum and Petrovskaia. This
reduced its ability to provide effective air support for the ground forces.
To the north, elements of 6th Army attempted to make further progress
towards Merefa and Zmiev. The 21st Tank Corps captured Dzhgun and Krasni
Gigant, while to the west the 49th Cavalry Division captured Kirillovka
and Voysokii to the north of Krasnograd. The 6th Cavalry Corps, supported
by the 7th Tank Brigade, encircled Krasnograd and began to fight for the
town.
Meanwhile Marshal Timoshenko, finally realizing the seriousness of the
position facing the southern shock group, attempted to reorganize his
forces to face the German penetration towards Izyum. The 19th of May saw
the southern shock group go over to the defensive and try to consolidate
its positions. German forces meanwhile, also redeployed with the 14th
and 16th Panzer and 60th Motorized Division pushing up to the line of
the Bereka River.
On the night of the 19th, Von Bock, commander of Army Group South, conferred
with Hitler by telephone, insisting that now was the time to implement
the original 'Friderikus' plan and complete the encirclement of the Russian
forces in the Barvenkovo salient by allowing Army Group Kleist to link
up with the 51st Army Corps at Balakleia.
The Destruction of the Barvenkovo Salient
Both sides spent the 20th of May reorganizing their forces
in and around the Barvenkovo salient. Russian activity was continually
harassed by the Luftwaffe and further hampered by poor communications.
During the 20th, the 14th Panzer Division captured Protopopovka, which
narrowed the neck of the pocket to only twelve miles.
On the 22nd, German forces began their attempt to seal the neck of the
pocket. In the south the 14th and 16th Panzer Divisions attacked northwards
from Protopopovka and Zagorodnoe toward Chepel and the 14th Panzer Division
reached Bayrak, to the south of Balakleia. In the north, the redeployed
elements of the 3rd and 23rd Panzer Divisions attacked southwards from
Balakleia and Andreevka smashing through the 337th and 47th Rifle Divisions,
forcing crossings of the Northern Donets River at Chervonyi Donets and
Krasnaia Gusarovka.
Timoshenko's reaction was to order elements of 38th Army to try to breakthrough
to the west and attempt to reestablish contact with the forces in the
pocket. The 242nd Rifle Division, supported by the 114th Tank Brigade,
crossed the Donets River at Savintsy and collecting the remnants of the
64th Tank Brigade managed to recapture Chepel. However the group was unable
to progress any further and took up defensive positions in the Chepel
area. At the same time, elements of the 6th and 57th Armies were to withdraw
eastwards to link up with the relief force. Further south, to the southwest
of Lozovaia, the Romanian 1st and 2nd Divisions attacked the 150th and
317th Divisions and captured Artelnoe, Mikhailovka, Sverkh and Novo Uplatnoe.
The 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps withdrew to the area of Lozovaia and further
to the northwest the 270th Rifle Division withdrew as far as Veselaia.
The remaining forces gradually began to contract the pocket, continually
harassed by German ground forces and air attacks from the Luftwaffe.
On
the 23rd, the German forces that had split the pocket, attempted to widen
the breach. Kleist's Panzer Gruppe spread eastwards from the axis of 14th
Panzer Division to form the outer wall of the pocket. The 16th Panzer
Division moved west and then north in the direction of Andreevka. Meanwhile
the 60th Motorized, 384th, 389th and the 100th Light Divisions fanned
out westwards to form the inner wall of the pocket. The 1st Mountain Division
occupied a buffer position in the area east of Federovka. By the end of
the day the 14th Panzer Division recaptured Chepel.
To the north the 3rd and 23rd Panzer Divisions broke out of their bridgeheads
at Andreevka and advanced towards Shebelinka and Kiseli, forcing the 337th
and 47th Rifle Divisions to withdraw to the south.
On the 24th, the two Panzer Divisions and elements of the 44th Infantry
Division captured Kiseli and spread westwards towards Verkhnii Bishkin
and Bukitselovka. To the west the 113th, 305th Infantry, 454th Security
and 1st Rumanian Division attacked along the entire western face of the
pocket, forcing it to contract eastwards.
On the 25th of May, the trapped forces in the pocket finally made a concerted
effort to break out to the east. A shock group formed from the remnants
of 317th, 393rd and 150th Rifle, 49th and 26th Cavalry Divisions and the
5th Guards, 7th and 37th Tank Brigades was created. It attacked in the
general direction of Chepel in an attempt to link up with the 114th Tank
Brigade. The assembly areas of the shock group came under German artillery
fire and continuous air attack and command and control began to break
down. Despite this, and whilst suffering heavy losses, the shock group
initially broke through the lines of the 60th Motorized and 389th Infantry
Divisions in the areas of Panteleeva Balka and Lozovenka. At this point
the 1st Mountain Division was moved north to block the shock groups path.
The remaining forces in the pocket were gradually reduced into a ten-mile
long by two-mile wide pocket centered on Sovetskii.
The heaviest fighting centered on Lozovenka as the shock group desperately
attacked in an effort to break out. They capture the town on the 26th
of May but were thrown out again on the morning of the 27th. Finally later
that day, elements of the 266th Rifle Division finally managed to break
out and by the morning of the 28th had reached Volvenkovo. Other elements
from within the pocket flooded though the breach in disarray and followed
on eastwards. On the night of the 29th of May, the group broke through
rear of the 384th Infantry Division and finally linked up with units from
the 38th Army to the south of Chepel.
Conclusion
The operation at Kharkov was a crushing defeat for the
Red Army. In addition to the huge loss of men and material, losses of
senior commanders cost the Red Army dearly during the subsequent summer
campaign. The failure of the operation was attributed to poor command
and control, especially by the 6th and 9th Armies. Commanders at all levels
were criticized for being unable to control large combined forces under
complex combat conditions and of being slow to react to the changing situation.
Also criticized was the lack of cooperation between the Southwestern and
Southern Fronts during the operation. Another failure of the operation
was the delay in using mobile forces to exploit breakthroughs because
the mobile forces were too far behind the leading echelon to be brought
forward in good time. Poor intelligence was also blamed for incorrectly
assessing the German forces, which faced the two Fronts prior to the operation,
and for not providing accurate information on German strengths and movements
during the course of the battle.
German air operations crippled the Russian ground operations throughout
and played a particularly effective part in helping to reduce the forces
trapped in the pocket. German flexibility and greater ability at all levels
of command to react to the situation and conduct fluid mobile operations,
enabled them to overcome the initial disadvantage and force a successful
conclusion to the battle. It would be late 1942 before this level of ability
to conduct mobile operations would begin to reach parity, and the situation
would be reversed at Stalingrad.
For a full and in depth account of this
battle, see David Glantz's account, Kharkov 1942 - Anatomy of a military
disaster through Soviet eyes. Details of the book are on the sources page.
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