The Luftwaffe

Following World War I, German aviation had been virtually abolished by the Treaty of Versailles. Determined to rebuild their military aviation, however, the Germans found ways of circumventing and then openly violating the terms of the agreement. The treaty did not prohibit the manufacture of commercial aircraft and it was under the guise of commercial aviation that the German Air Force began its recovery. German aircraft manufacturers also established subsidiary companies in neutral countries, where the production of aircraft could proceed without regard to limitations. Factories were built by Junkers in Russia, Sweden, and Turkey, by Rohrback, in Denmark, by Heinkel in Sweden, and by Dornier in Italy and Switzerland. The aircraft which were manufactured in Germany were still civilian aircraft, but they had been designed with a view to conversion to fulfil military roles. The formation of flying clubs was encouraged throughout Germany, which gave flying and gliding training to thousands of members. In addition, pilot training schools were set up, ostensibly for airline pilots, but actually qualified them to operate bombers.
In March 1935 the Germans officially announced the formation of the Luftwaffe. The air force was then composed of approximately 1000 aircraft and some 20,000 officers and men. In February 1938 four air fleets were established, each composed of a number of air divisions. Each of these air divisions constituted a balanced force of bomber, fighter, and reconnaissance units. By the time the Luftwaffe engaged the Russian VVS in 1941 it had fought highly successful campaigns in Poland, Norway, France and the low countries and had endured an unsuccessful campaign against the R.A.F during the Battle of Britain. However despite this setback, its pilots and ground crew were highly experienced, morale was high and its aircraft were all battle tried.
On the 22nd of June 1941, the combined assets of four Luftwaffe air fleets struck a devastating blow against the Red Air Force. During the opening phase of the operation the Luftwaffe targeted airfields, railroads, railroad stations, transportation choke points and the port facilities at Sevastopol. Preliminary Russian losses from the first Luftwaffe strikes totaled 222 aircraft destroyed in the air and 890 on the ground. German aircraft losses for the first wave totaled only 18 aircraft. The German air campaign during Barbarossa provided an excellent example of the Luftwaffe's operational style. Tactics, weapons, and size of formation were all decided at the squadron level. Interference from higher headquarters was, in general, kept to a minimum, and aircrew opinions were highly regarded. Bombing of the Russian aircraft industry was not possible at the start of Barbarossa because the Luftwaffe had no bombers with sufficient range and payload to reach the Russian factories. It is also noteworthy that operational readiness of Luftwaffe units at the start of Barbarossa was only 70%, as it was felt more important to maintain surprise than operational readiness. The shock effect on Red Air Force pilots was pronounced and as a result morale and confidence suffered considerably.
Once the initial phase was complete the Luftwaffe mission shifted quickly to interdiction and close air support. There was also a heavy emphasis on preventing the withdrawal of Red Army forces deep into the interior of the country, as well as hindering the reinforcement of front-line forces with manpower and materiel reserves. Also air reconnaissance was highly valued by the German Army and approximately 25% of German combat aircraft were assigned to this role.
However as the campaign in the East drew on, the Luftwaffe struggled to function effectively. Attrition among its pilots was allowed to continue, without replacements or reserves being provided. It forced the Luftwaffe to temporarily use its training reserves to provide the pilots so urgently needed. In the long term, this short sightedness on the part of the High Command started a downward spiral of pilot quality, as the training reserves had to be used more and more to make up for those men lost. Training courses were gradually shortened to provide aircrews more rapidly, but again this affected pilot quality. In Germany the High Command failed to prepare the economic capacity of the Reich and to utilize captured western infrastructure and raw materials for a war of attrition on such a large scale. Perhaps the most devastating of the flaws made by the High Command was the scant attention it paid to the logistical difficulties of supporting troops deep inside Russia, a flaw which lead to the disasters in the winter of 1941 and the general lack of supplies and reinforcements which the the Luftwaffe had to deal with throughout the campaign. A lack of maintenance capability, long and inefficient supply lines, bad weather and primitive operating conditions, rapidly reduced the Luftwaffe's operational capabilities. By the end of December 1941, only 54% of available single-engine fighters and 32% of bombers were actually operational. The attrition of pilots and aircraft operating constantly and without respite, also affected the Luftwaffe's combat strength.
All of these factors combined to create a cycle, whereby actual numbers of aircraft in combat stayed roughly the same, while their crew's experience and quality of training slowly declined. To make matters worse the VVS and its infrastructure was starting to recover from its mauling in 1941. The Russian aviation industry having moved eastwards, began to reach full production in mid 1942, producing larger quantities of ever improving aircraft types. The German air units on the other hand were essentially being bled dry.
In November 1941, Erhard Milch was installed as State Secretary for aircraft production. During his time in this role he revolutionized German aircraft production. During 1942 German aircraft production figures rose from 981 aircraft per month to 1548. This resulted from improvements in allocation of raw material and production and labor efficiencies. During the spring of 1942 the Luftwaffe was gradually built back up to a strength of around 2700 aircraft. In addition to increased production, the Luftwaffe maintenance units in the field were improving the number of aircraft operationally ready. This rose from 39% in December to 69% in June 1942. However despite these improvements aircraft losses also continued to increase.
In 1942, the Demyansk and Kholm pockets were supplied from the middle of February to May by air. The limited size of the Kholm pocket meant most supplies were either dropped by parachute or landed by glider. The larger Demyansk pocket maintained two airfields at Demyansk and Peski. During the four months of the two airlift operations, the pockets were provided with over 65,000 tons of supplies, 31,000 troops and the evacuation of 36,000 wounded. However the cost was high, with the Luftwaffe losing 265 transport aircraft and this was despite a marked lack VVS activity in the area.
In May 1942 the Luftwaffe resumed its roll of attempting to maintain air superiority while providing close air support to advancing German troops. Its aircraft provided considerable support to German ground forces attempting to capture the Crimea. On the 5th of June the Luftwaffe began its ariel bombardment of the city of Sevastopol. During the following five days it flew up to 1000 sorties per day. By the beginning of July, resistance in the Crimea had collapsed and the majority of aircraft were moved north to support the main German offensive. However by August the Luftwaffe's lines of supply were again stretched and it was operating from primitive forward airstrips. On the 23rd of August 1942 the Luftwaffe began its ariel bombardment of Stalingrad. In the first week of the assault on the city, its aircraft flew 1600 sorties and dropped over 1000 tons of bombs. Between August and November, four bomber and five fighter groups were taken from the Eastern Front and deployed to other theatres. This combined with an attrition rate of almost 250 aircraft per month saw the Luftwaffe in the east struggle to maintain any kind of superiority against the VVS.
The winter of 1942 saw the Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front stretched to breaking point in an attempt to maintain the Stalingrad airlift. Appalling weather conditions and aircraft flying from temporary airfields, at the limit of their range, contrived to reduced the effectiveness of the airlift. However the Luftwaffe simply did not have enough suitable aircraft to support 6th Army trapped inside the pocket. The Red Air Force had gained ariel superiority over the pocket and this lead to heavy losses of transport aircraft. On only three days during the entire airlift, did the Luftwaffe manage to transport over 300 tons of supplies into the pocket. By the middle of January all of the forward airfields had been lost and operational readiness of the transport fleet had been reduced to 33%.
Following the surrender of the pocket at the end of January, the Luftwaffe was freed from the single-minded duty of supporting the trapped army. It rebuilt its strength, incorporated new units and aircraft types, and re-allocated its ground attack pilots. General von Richthofen, who had opposed the massive airlift into Stalingrad, consolidated and reorganized Luftwaffe operations in the south under one command. As part of the reorganization, units performing below par had their personnel shipped back to Germany for more training, while more battle-experienced crews took their place.
During 1943 German aircraft production increased by 64%, but despite this rise, the level of attrition at the front was almost as high. By August the number of aircraft available to frontline squadrons began to decrease. In January and February the Luftwaffe was flying up to 1000 sorties per day in support of Army Group South. It was also heavily involved in supporting German forces in northern Russia around the area of Velikiye Luki.
The lull in ground fighting that followed during the muddy season saw little respite for the Luftwaffe. The air defence of the Kuban bridgehead in the Caucasus resulted in heavy air activity on both sides. During March and April repeated air strikes were flown by the Luftwaffe in support of the German attempt to dislodge the Russian beachhead to the southwest of Novorossisk. In late April, the Russians also launched an offensive at Krymskaya and the Red Air Force provided extensive air support for this offensive, resulting in intense air battles with the Luftwaffe. Finally, in late May the Russians renewed their offensive along the well-fortified 'Blue Line' which secured the central German sector of the Kuban bridgehead. Again, air activity was intense with considerable losses on both sides.
The German offensive against the Kursk salient in July 1943, saw the Luftwaffe fly almost 3000 combat sorties on the first day alone. On the 5th of July a preemptive strike by the Russian 17th Air Army in the southern sector of the salient was detected by German radar. A huge arial battle ensued as the German fighters wrought havoc and the Russians suffered heavy losses. However a lack of fuel began to curtail the Luftwaffe's effectiveness and the Russians rapidly established air superiority, as the sheer weight of numbers as well as an ever-increasing level of ability began to tell. Following the failure of Citadel, the Russians unleashed a vast offensive along the entire southern front. The battles for Orel, Kharkov and the ensuing Russian offensive along the Lower Donets stretched the Luftwaffe to breaking point as it attempted to bolster the deteriorating situation on the ground. In July and August the Luftwaffe in the East lost over 1000 aircraft, a rate of attrition which it could not sustain. In addition it would have to meet growing commitments in North Africa and Sicily, and the defence of the Reich against allied raids began to curtail the Luftwaffe's capabilities on the Eastern Front. In October 1943, during the German defence of the Krivoi Rog area in the Ukraine, the Luftwaffe was flying over 1200 combat sorties a day in support of the operation.
During 1944 aircraft production was again increased, this time by 24%, despite heavy allied bombing of German industry beginning to have a serious effect. The competence of new pilots was also decreasing as training programs were shortened and a lack of fuel forced a reduction in training flights. In February 1944, during the aerial re-supply of the Korsun pocket, to the south of Kiev, the Luftwaffe flew in 2026 tons of supplies and evacuated 2825 wounded before the airstrip inside the pocket was abandoned on the 13th. The remainder of 1944 saw the Luftwaffe in the east used purely in the support of hard pressed ground forces as they were battered by one Russian offensive after another. The rapid collapse of ground forces forced the Luftwaffe to operate from airfields in Poland and East Prussia. The Red Air Force possessed a huge numerical superiority and endless supplies of fuel and material. It was operating with ever more effective aircraft types, many superior to their German adversaries, and ever more experienced pilots and ground crew. Over commitment, high rates of attrition, a lack of sufficient air crews and the effects of the allied bombing campaign on aircraft production, saw Luftwaffe activity in the east steadily dwindle away. In addition units in the east were gradually being stripped of aircraft and aircrew in order to reinforce the deteriorating situation in the west.

Conclusion

The demise of the once mighty Luftwaffe lay in its total mismanagement by the German High Command, whose requirements were far beyond its abilities. Despite the crushing blow it delt to the Red Air Force at the beginning of the eastern campaign, this advantage was allowed to diminish as the VVS gradually rebuilt itself and gradually overwhelmed the Luftwaffe, gaining almost total air superiority on all fronts by mid 1944. The Luftwaffe's technical superiority was allowed to dwindle away as it upgraded existing aircraft, instead of introducing new ones, and a badly managed production programme failed to produce aircraft in sufficient numbers. Over commitment lead to a rate of attrition the Luftwaffe could not sustain and both quality of aircraft and aircrew gradually deteriorated. The particularly difficult operational and logistical difficulties that arose during the eastern campaign also reduced its fighting capability. By the end of the war the Luftwaffe was a shadow of its former self, gradually fighting a worsening battle of attrition, which it had no hope of winning.